











Title of Document: EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF 
SELECTIVITY ON ALUMNI GIVING AT 
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES:  A DYNAMIC PANEL 
MODELING APPROACH 
  
 Sean Anthony Simone, Doctor of Philosophy, 2009 
  
Directed By: Marvin A. Titus, Ph.D. 
Department of Education Leadership, Higher 
Education, and International Education 
 
 
This study examines the influence of institutional selectivity on alumni giving 
among public research universities, using a conceptual framework based on the 
economics of nonprofit organizations.   This study introduces a dynamic panel 
modeling technique, which addresses many limitations that more traditional statistical 
models have when applied to panel data with lagged or “dynamic” variables.  Using 
panel data from 147 public universities over 11 years, the analysis for this study 
compares the results from ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects, and 
instrumental variable (2SLS) regression with a dynamic fixed effects panel model 
using a procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  This dynamic panel 
modeling technique allows researchers to simultaneously discern the relationship 
between variables and take into account the possible endogeneity and omitted 
  
variable biases, as well as determine conditional convergence or divergence of the 
values of key observed variables over time.   
The results indicate that ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and instrumental 
variable regression models yield different coefficients, standard errors, and 
probability values for hypothesis tests.  Results from the most robust technique, a 
dynamic panel fixed effects model using system generalized method of moments, did 
not indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists between student 
selectivity and alumni giving.  However, the presence of a law or medical program 
and institutional wealth were statistically significant.  Additionally, there is no 
evidence of convergence or divergence of alumni giving rates. 
The results from this analysis have a number of implications.  First, the 
statistically insignificant relationship between selectivity and alumni giving 
challenges a major paradigm in the literature regarding the influence of this measure 
of prestige on alumni giving.  Future studies should test the influence of other 
conceptions of prestige and donative support, using dynamic panel modeling, to see if 
the results are similar.  Second, this analysis shows that statistical models prominent 
in the literature can yield misleading results when applied to panel data.  Researchers, 
therefore, must take great care in using the most appropriate technique when 
examining dynamic panel data.  Finally, this analysis indicates that more complex 
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This study examines the influence of an institution’s selectivity on the amount of 
alumni giving among public research universities.  Defining prestige as student 
selectivity and using a conceptual framework based on the economics of nonprofit 
organizations, this study addresses the following research questions: 
1. After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent 
does an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
2. Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence 
or divergence among public research universities over time in alumni 
giving? 
In the second research question, convergence occurs when alumni giving rates approach 
the average rate over time.  Divergence, on the other hand, occurs when alumni giving 
rates move away from the average rate over time. 
The research questions in this study are pertinent because of the increasing 
importance of donative revenue in higher education.  Over time, public colleges and 
universities have experienced declining revenues, resulting from reductions in state 
appropriations (Heller, 2006; Mortenson, 2004) and increasing costs (Winston, 1999; 
Zemsky, Wegner, & Massy, 2005).  Public colleges and universities are forced to offset 
declining revenues by seeking private support (Conley & Tempel, 2006).  Revenues from 
non-tuition-based sources, such as alumni giving, are required to offset reductions in state 
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appropriations and increased administrative costs.  The practice of raising funds from 
alumni and other private sources has implications for tuition, which in turn affects college 
access and the services higher education institutions can offer for the public good.  The 
research questions for this study are designed to contribute to the higher education 
literature by using panel data (also known as time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data) and 
the most appropriate and robust statistical technique to discern if selectivity influences 
alumni giving over time. 
The research questions for this study are relevant for four reasons.  First, many 
public research universities have sought to increase their prestige within the higher 
education industry at great expense, in part to increase their magazine rankings 
(especially the U.S. News and World Report rankings) and financial resources (including 
alumni giving) (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; O'Meara, 2007; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; 
Winston, 2000; Zemsky, Shaman, & Shapiro, 2001).  Second, aside from a few of studies 
on alumni giving (Gottfried & Johnson, 2006; Harrison, 1995; Harrison, Mitchell, & 
Peterson, 1995; Monks, 2003; Yoo & Harrison, 1989), most research focuses on only one 
institution or does not use panel data.  Third, most of the literature that addresses 
selectivity or alumni giving is disproportionately focused on private nonprofit four-year 
colleges and universities, without as much attention to public four-year higher education 
institutions.  Fourth, few studies use an organizational perspective of colleges and 
universities to examine alumni giving, nor does the alumni giving literature examine how 
changes in alumni support may be influenced by changes in institutional selectivity.  
Instead, prior studies focused on the relationship between alumni giving and individual 
characteristics.  This study attempts to address these limitations in the literature.  This 
3 
chapter will describe the purpose of the study, provide a background for the problem, 
present a conceptual framework, and briefly describe the methodology used in this 
research.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether selectivity influences the amount 
of alumni giving among public research universities.  Using a conceptual framework 
based on the economics of nonprofit organizations (Garvin, 1980; Winston, 1999), this 
study proposes an approach that allows one to explain the influence of selectivity on 
alumni giving, taking into account predictors of selectivity and unobservable institutional 
level variables.  Additionally, the second research question explores the extent to which, 
over time, there is a divergence or convergence in alumni giving among public research 
institutions, given the predictors of alumni giving. 
This study demonstrates the use of an appropriate approach to examine alumni 
giving in higher education using panel data.  This study uses dynamic fixed effects panel 
(DFEP) modeling to examine if selectivity influences alumni giving.  This approach can 
provide a basis for examining other research questions on alumni giving at higher 
education institutions, using panel data and appropriate statistical techniques.   
   
Background of the Problem 
According to the Council for Aid to Education, 59% of individual donations to 
higher education institutions in fiscal 2007 came from alumni (Kaplan, 2008).  Because 
donative support of higher education is developing into a significant source of revenue 
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(Conley & Tempel, 2006), research on alumni giving is becoming more important.  This 
section illustrates two basic problems in higher education research when studying alumni 
giving and private support:  theoretical justifications for donor behavior and increasing 
costs in higher education. 
Andreoni (2006) observes that philanthropy and donor behavior are puzzling 
concepts for economists.  It is not easy to incorporate an unselfish act into a field based 
on the study of self-interested behavior.  Neoclassical economic theories cannot 
adequately explain philanthropy and donative support.  These theories typically presume 
that donors make rational decisions with perfect information so that any contributions 
benefit the well-being of the donor.  Under this perspective, the act of philanthropy 
benefits the donor.  This perspective, however, does not reflect actual behaviors observed 
in the philanthropic environment (Andreoni, 2006).  Alternative explanations are required 
to explain donor behavior.   
In higher education, understanding donor behavior is becoming more important 
because non-tuition revenues are used to address the problem of higher college costs.  
Reducing costs and enhancing efficiency have been longstanding problems in higher 
education.  Colleges and universities have long been criticized for experiencing cost and 
tuition increases beyond the rates of inflation (Ehrenberg, 2002b; Johnstone, 2001).  
Critics of higher education who claim that colleges and universities are not cost efficient 
implicitly assume that the majority of colleges and universities should behave as 
businesses adhering to the economic model of a “firm” or a for-profit organization.  The 
neoclassical economic theory of the firm posits that cost minimization is a characteristic 
of profit maximizing behaviors. This theory, however, is not appropriate when examining 
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not-for-profit higher education institutions (Garvin, 1980; Hansmann, 1981; Weisbrod, 
1988).  Instead of maximizing profits or increasing efficiency by cutting unprofitable 
services, many public colleges and universities increase their prestige to increase college 
rankings and financial resources (O'Meara, 2007).  Although this strategy appears to be 
successful for wealthy institutions, colleges and universities that strive to increase 
prestige also increase costs (O'Meara, 2007; Winston, 1999).  Higher education 
institutions attempt to cover these increased costs with revenue generated from grants 
(mostly from research) and donative support such as alumni giving. 
Although prestige has been identified by a number of scholars (O’Meara, 2007; 
Winston, 2009) as a mechanism for increasing costs, the concept has many definitions.  
For the purposes of this study, prestige is defined as student quality measured by student 
selectivity (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 
2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b).  Although there is much 
evidence that student selectivity is a poor predictor of outcomes and of student quality 
(Pascarella, 2001; Pascarella et al., 2006; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005; Pike, 2004), 
scholars (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) still view selectivity as a 
measure of an institution’s prestige in conjunction with faculty research productivity 
(Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002), success in intercollegiate athletics (Tucker & Amato, 
1993), and college rankings (O’Meara, 2007).   Several studies (Ehrenberg, 2002a; 
Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Machung, 1998; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 
1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b; O'Meara, 2007; Winston, 1999) provide evidence 
that higher education administrators increase the student selectivity of their institutions in 
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an effort to enhance the prestige of their colleges or universities.  As a result, this study 
focuses on the influence of prestige, measured by student selectivity, on alumni giving at 
public research universities. 
Increasing the selectivity of a college or university has both positive and negative 
consequences.  Although higher education institutions with high prestige appear to have 
more resources and higher graduation rates (Geiger, 2004; Meredith, 2004; Winston, 
1999), there may be several unintended consequences.  Some scholars claim that 
investing in prestige increases tuition prices (Winston, 1999) and consequently limits 
access to college for minority and low income students (Bernal, Cabrera, & Terenzini, 
2002; Meredith, 2004), reduces the emphasis on classroom engagement and student 
learning (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Pike, 2004; Winston, 1999), increases faculty 
workload, and reduces institutional diversity (O'Meara, 2007). 
In spite of efforts to learn more about the effects of prestige on colleges and 
universities, little is known about how prestige impacts donative support and alumni 
giving over time.  Using a theoretical framework grounded in the economic model of 
nonprofit organizations and extended to public higher education institutions, this study 
examines how one definition of prestige (student selectivity) influences alumni giving at 
public research universities.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study is based on economic concepts that 
describe how nonprofit organizations, such as research universities, strive to increase 
their prestige or status rather than maximize profits (Garvin, 1980; Newhouse, 1970).  
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This framework departs from the traditional economic model of profit maximization to 
describe the behavior of nonprofit organizations and provides an alternative framework 
using the concept of utility (Garvin, 1980; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Valentinov, 
2006).  According to Lee (1971) utility is used in economics to describe all the factors 
that affect the well-being of individuals, including administrators within nonprofit 
organizations.  These factors include salary, prestige, security, power, recognition, and 
professional standing.  Given Lee’s (1971) conceptualization of utility as applied to 
nonprofit higher education institutions, the underlying assumption of this framework 
suggests that college administrators and faculty at nonprofit colleges and universities 
engage in utility-maximizing behavior by seeking to increase the prestige of their 
institutions. 
Drawing on the broader economic literature on nonprofit organizations, this 
dissertation will discuss why these organizations seek to maximize prestige (under the 
auspices of quality) instead of profits.  The discussion of the economics of nonprofit 
organizations will focus on public research universities and describe how these 
institutions increase utility by maximizing prestige.  The study utilizes a theoretical 
framework that includes concepts reflecting institutional prestige of and alumni giving to 
public research universities. 
The reasons that public research universities maximize prestige originated within 
the broader economics literature on nonprofit organizations.  When describing nonprofit 
organizations, scholars (Hansmann, 1981; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Raines & 
Leathers, 2003; Weisbrod, 1988) note that the lack of incentives to maximize profits 
allow administrators of nonprofit organizations to focus on other outcomes, such as 
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prestige.  Because nonprofit organizations aren’t legally permitted to distribute any 
surplus revenues to owners, administrators in nonprofit organizations seek to maximize 
utility in other ways (Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Valentinov, 2006).  At most nonprofit 
organizations, an administrator’s values are aligned with the values of the organization.  
Any enhancement to the organization itself or to its prestige enhances the administrator’s 
well-being and utility (James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Newhouse, 1970).  In an effort to 
increase the prestige of the organization, administrators of nonprofit organizations seek to 
increase the quality of the product or services produced by the organization (Lee, 1971; 
Newhouse, 1970).  
These observations of nonprofit organizations are also applicable to nonprofit 
higher education institutions, including public research universities.  Many nonprofit 
colleges and universities also increase utility via prestige maximization.  Like the broader 
nonprofit sector, nonprofit colleges and universities do not seek to minimize costs in 
order to maximize profits (Winston, 1999).  Instead, many nonprofit colleges and 
universities divert excess revenues to subsidize activities that may be associated with 
prestige-maximizing behaviors, such as increasing the student selectivity of the 
institution (Geiger, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) or 
recruiting talented faculty (Ehrenberg, 2002b; Garvin, 1980).  These activities require 
extra revenues from external sources, such as alumni donations, to cover increased costs. 
Applying the nonprofit economic framework advanced by several scholars (e.g., 
Garvin, 1980; Winston, 1999) to higher education, alumni giving and other non-tuition-
based revenue provides college and university administrators the resources to maximize 
utility via increases in prestige.  This theoretical framework posits that alumni giving 
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would increase as prestige is maximized at a college or university.  Although some level 
of altruism may be present in alumni who give to a college or university, several scholars 
(Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) suggest that alumni seek to maximize 
utility in their relationships with the college or university as well.  Alumni gain 
satisfaction through the success or prestige of their institution because of the close 
relationship they have with the university as former students (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
While alumni may be motivated to make a donation by other factors in addition to the 
prestige of an institution, this study examines prestige as a primary motivator.  Other 
motivations of alumni giving are explored in more detail in chapter 2.   
As stated above, this study defines prestige in terms of an institution’s student 
selectivity (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b).  While recognizing that prestige may also be viewed in 
terms of faculty research productivity (Brewer et al., 2002; Dey, Milem, & Berger, 1997; 
Melguizo & Strober, 2007; Milem, Berger, & Dey, 2000), success in intercollegiate 
athletics (Brewer et al., 2002; Tucker & Amato, 1993), or college rankings (O’Meara, 
2007), this study utilizes a narrow definition of prestige to simplify the model.   
Using the student selectivity definition of prestige, Figure 1.1 presents this study’s 
conceptual framework, which illustrates the hypothesis that prestige influences alumni 
giving.  As shown in Figure 1.1, current alumni giving is a function of previous alumni 
giving, prestige, and other institutional characteristics.  Prestige is a function of an 
institution’s wealth and level of expenditures.  The model includes only constructs at the 





Figure 1.1.  Conceptual framework:  A dynamic model of alumni giving 
 
 
The conceptual framework for this study is represented by a system of equations.  Given 
the above conceptual framework, alumni giving (AGit) in the current period is a function 
of alumni giving (AGir-1) in a previous period, prestige (Pit), and other institutional 
characteristics (ICit) known from the literature to influence alumni giving.  This dynamic 
conceptual framework is reflected in the equation presented below: 
AGit = f (AGit-1, Pit, ICit)    (1.1), 
where i denotes the institution and t denotes the year.  Within this conceptual framework, 















institutional wealth (Wit) and institutional expenditures (Eit), as reflected in the second 
equation presented below:    
Pit, = f (Wit, Eit)      (1.2). 
This conceptual framework is grounded in the economic theory of the nonprofit 
organization and extended to higher education institutions to help explain the influence of 
selectivity on alumni giving among public research universities. 
 
Methodology 
 Because the above conceptual framework is dynamic in nature, this study 
employs an advanced econometric technique known as dynamic fixed effects panel 
(DFEP) modeling to examine the influence of selectivity on alumni giving among public 
research universities.  Using panel data, DFEP modeling allows researchers to 
simultaneously discern the relationship between variables and take into account the 
possible non-stationary data as well as endogeneity and omitted variable biases.  
Additionally, DFEP modeling enables analysts to determine conditional convergence or 
divergence of the values of key observed variables over time.  In this study, DFEP 
modeling techniques are used to address the research questions.  This section briefly 
describes the research design, the data used for the analysis, the statistical method, and 
the limitations of this study. 
 
Research Design 
 The research design involves the use of panel data, also known as time series-
cross sectional (TSCS) data covering 147 public research universities across 11 years, 
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from fiscal 1997 through fiscal 2007.  The panel data are based on surveys of colleges 
and universities that contain institutional information such as endowment income, 




This study utilizes secondary data drawn from three distinct sources.  The first 
data source is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), sponsored 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  The data collected in these 
surveys provide aggregate measures of an institution’s yearly financial, enrollment, and 
institutional characteristics (e.g., institutional mission, degree offerings, sector of 
institution).  NCES conducts regular technical quality control studies of the data to ensure 
the surveys are standardized across institutions and the integrity of the data is maintained 
(Jackson, Peecksen, Jang, & Sukasih, 2005).  IPEDS data are based on the collection of 
information from eight surveys.  For this study, IPEDS data are drawn from the 
Institutional Characteristics, the Completions, the Fall Enrollment, and the Finance 
surveys.  These surveys provide enrollment, institutional expenditures, institutional type, 
and the presence of professional degree programs as variables in this study. 
The second data source draws from an annual survey on voluntary support from 
the Council for Aid to Education (CAE).  Beginning in 1957, the CAE has conducted the 
Voluntary Support of Education (VSE) yearly surveys in all sectors of education, from 
colleges and universities to secondary schools.  The survey collects data in such areas as 
grants, gifts, endowments, real estate, deferred gifts, cash payments, number of 
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alumni/individuals solicited, number of alumni/individuals that gave, and other forms of 
support from various sources (alumni, individuals, and organizations).  The VSE survey 
provides standard measures across institutions for every year the survey has been offered.  
This study draws on alumni giving and endowment data in the VSE survey. 
The third data source comes from the U. S. News and World Report indicators that 
are used to develop the magazine’s ranking scheme.   Although prior to 1990 there were 
concerns about the integrity of the data that U. S. News used (Mallette, 1995), the 
definitions for the U.S. News data are consistent across institutions for the years of 
interest in this study.  The U. S. News rankings provide institutional student selectivity 
data as measured by the midpoint of SAT/ACT test scores of the institution’s incoming 
freshmen class.  Together, these data sources result in 147 public research universities 
that have participated in all three surveys between fiscal 1997 and fiscal 2007, potentially 
yielding 1,364 cases. 
 
Statistical Method 
This study employs DFEP modeling techniques to address the research questions.  
This statistical technique is appropriate for this study for at least three reasons.  First, due 
to the panel data and the dynamic nature of the equations in the model (Equations 1.1 and 
1.2) that will be used in this study, several researchers (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano 
& Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) recommend a DFEP modeling technique as the 
most appropriate statistical method.  Second, DFEP modeling techniques allow 
researchers to take into account the possible endogeneity of key predictor variables.  In 
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this study, selectivity is posited to be a key predictor of alumni giving and addressed in 
the following research question: 
1. After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent 
does an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
Third, while taking into account the possible endogeneity of variables and unobserved 
effects or omitted variable bias, DFEP modeling techniques allow researchers to 
determine whether, among units of analysis (e.g., colleges and universities), convergence 
or divergence in the value of a variable of interest (e.g., alumni giving) is occurring over 
time.  In this study, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is used to address the 
following research question: 
2. Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence 
or divergence among public research universities over time in alumni 
giving? 
The sign of the lagged dependent variable coefficient indicates whether there is 
convergence or divergence in alumni giving among public research universities.  The 
results generated from the DFEP modeling technique are compared with the results 
derived from ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effect, and instrumental variable (2SLS) 
regression analyses in chapter 4. 
 
Limitations 
This study has at least four limitations.  First, data used in this research are based 
on secondary sources.   Second, this study examines the influence of selectivity on 
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alumni giving only at public research universities.  Caution should be used when 
interpreting any potential findings from this study to other sectors or institution types.  
Third, this study employs a statistical technique (DFEP modeling) that does not infer 
causation between alumni giving and institutional prestige.  Fourth, this study uses a 
rational perspective drawn from the field of economics to understand the conceptual 
framework used in this study.  In future studies, other perspectives and frameworks 
should be used to examine the influence of prestige on alumni giving to higher education 
institutions.  Despite these limitations, this study generates results that will have 
implications in several areas.  
 
Implications 
 This study has potential implications for methods and theory.  First, because it 
uses a panel as opposed to a cross-sectional dataset, this study addresses the 
methodological limitations of prior research.  The use of cross-sectional data does not 
allow for the examination of the relationship between alumni giving and selectivity over 
time nor can it account for possible unobservable variables.   
Second, because previous studies of alumni giving are typically based on 
individual and not organizational behavior, the findings in this study may further 
contribute to theory.  This study uses an economic perspective for examining the 
influence of selectivity on alumni giving.  Because researchers who examine alumni 
giving rarely use economic perspectives of nonprofit organizations, this study contributes 
to the literature by introducing a new conceptual framework. 
16 
 Third, this study demonstrates the use of DFEP modeling techniques.  These 
statistics enable researchers to investigate the dynamic nature of the relationship inherent 
in many financial and economic variables.  Future studies may employ this technique to 
address other research questions in higher education finance.  The following chapter 
presents a review of the broader literature on the economic theory of nonprofit 
organizations, prestige in higher education, and alumni giving among nonprofit colleges 






This chapter reviews the literature used to develop the conceptual framework for 
this study.  This chapter applies concepts from the literature on the economics of 
nonprofit organizations to higher education institutions and discusses the hypothesized 
relationship between selectivity and alumni giving at public research universities. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section of this chapter reviews 
the literature on the economics of philanthropic giving as it relates to higher education 
institutions.  The second section of this chapter reviews the literature on the economics of 
nonprofit organizations as it relates to the scholarship on nonprofit public higher 
education.  The third section of the chapter discusses the literature on prestige in higher 
education within the context of various frameworks.  The fourth section of this chapter 
presents the conceptual framework that is used in this study.  
 
I. Alumni Giving 
According to the Council for Aid to Education, 59% of individual donations to 
higher education institutions in fiscal 2007 came from alumni (Kaplan, 2008).  Because 
alumni represent a significant source of private funding for higher education institutions, 
one would expect that as investments in prestige increases, so would activities to 
encourage alumni giving.  Most studies on alumni giving in higher education, however, 
do not examine how organizational behaviors, such as enhancing selectivity, influence 
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the level of alumni donations.  Instead, prior research focuses on individual aspects of 
giving (Brittingham & Pezzullo, 1990; Monks, 2003; Taylor & Martin, 1995; Weerts & 
Ronca, 2006) or the structural characteristics of colleges and universities that are 
associated with alumni giving (Bristol, 1990; Harris, 1990; Harrison, 1995; Monks, 2003; 
Smith & Ehrenberg, 2003).  Although past studies are valuable in developing an 
understanding of individual giving behavior, they do not contribute to an understanding 
of how organizational behaviors, such as enhancing selectivity, influence alumni giving.  
This section will first present the literature on alumni giving in higher education to 
provide a context for this study.  The section then discusses the literature on donative 
support as it relates to the pursuit of prestige at higher education institutions. 
 
Context:  Alumni Giving in the Higher Education Literature 
Although this study uses an economic/rational approach to examine the influence 
of selectivity on alumni giving, other theoretical perspectives are discussed in the 
literature on giving behaviors.  Research on the donative support of organizations and 
charitable causes comes mostly from the fields of economics, sociology, and psychology.  
The purpose of this section is to review the theoretical perspectives and research on 
alumni giving to provide a context for how the conceptual framework used in this 
dissertation may contribute to an understanding of the influence of selectivity on alumni 
giving at public research universities. 
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Theories of Alumni Giving 
Prior studies on alumni giving utilize several broad theoretical perspectives, 
including:  (1) public good theory, (2) social exchange theory, (3) expectancy theory, (4) 
the life cycle hypothesis, (5) the investment model, (6) organization theory, and (7) 
neoclassical economics.  Most contemporary studies integrate multiple theories to 
provide a comprehensive perspective on alumni giving.  This section describes each of 
these theoretical perspectives. 
 
Public Good Theory and Altruism 
 Public good theory assumes that donations serve the collective interest.  Donors 
gain utility from the total charitable output and not from their own well being (Andreoni, 
2006; Halfpenny, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Sun, Hoffman, & Grady, 2007).  
Although altruism may be one factor in a donor’s motivation, research (Andreoni, 1990; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1996) has shown that it is rare that pure altruism can accurately describe 
donors in a market.  Rose-Ackerman (1996) argues that pure altruism is not the only 
mechanism that motivates donors because of “free-rider” problems (i.e., an individual 
lacks the motivation to donate because he or she benefits from the collective donations 
from others).  She asserts that a low percentage of the population actually makes 
donations, especially in relation to government social welfare spending.  Andreoni (1990) 
further observes that as a population increases, altruistic motives diminish and average 
donations decrease toward zero, leaving only the wealthiest donors making donations.  
Therefore, other factors beyond pure altruism motivate donor philanthropy. 
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 Andreoni (1990) proposes a public good theory based on “impure altruism.”  
Summarizing other research, Andreoni (1990) claims that “pure altruism,” (a theory that 
donors contribute for the sake of public good without recognition to the individual) lacks 
predictive power.  Andreoni (1990) states that the alternative model of “warm glow” is 
consistent with observed patterns of giving.  Warm glow incorporates feelings of social 
pressure, guilt, or sympathy as well as positive feelings that benefit the individual.  When 
donors give, they not only gain utility through increasing the total supply of public goods, 
they also gain utility through the act of giving itself.   
 Building on the work of Andreoni’s (1990) warm glow theory, other economists 
have augmented altruism theories with other factors to better explain donor behavior in 
the environment.  Harbaugh (1998a; 1998b) presents a model  of impure altruism where 
alumni donors maximize utility through personal prestige.  Harbaugh (1998a; 1998b) 
asserts that donors are motivated by personal prestige in the form of recognition, 
publicized donations, and rewards, in addition to internal satisfaction.  Harbaugh (1998a) 
found general support for this model using panel data from one prestigious law school, 
but has yet to expand these findings to other professional programs or universities. 
 Given that Andreoni (1990) and Rose-Ackerman (1996) advocate for a theory that 
focuses on impure altruism, the theory can easily be integrated with other theories.  This 
flexibility allows scholars to account for altruistic motives as well as other factors not 





Social Exchange Theory 
 Social exchange theory, from the field of sociology, provides another perspective 
on donor behavior.  Halfpenny (1989) and Holländer (1990) assert that cooperative 
behavior is motivated by the expectation of social approval.  The likelihood of a 
donation, therefore, is dependent on the strength of the social approval incentive.  
Halfpenny (1989) believes that strict rational/economic assumptions of the charity market 
are unsustainable in the absence of these norms of social reciprocity.  Holländer (1990) 
further contends that a donor is likely to make a donation when he or she subjectively 
perceives a social benefit in the relationship.  An alumna/us donor, for example, will need 
to perceive a social benefit in the relationship with the college or university in order to 
make a donation.  When the donor perceives there will be little benefit in the relationship, 
then he or she will not make the donation.   
 
Investment Model 
 Another theory adapted to describe donor behavior and alumni giving is the 
investment model.  Based on a study by Rusbult (1980), Weerts and Ronca (2006) posit 
that attraction and satisfaction in a relationship is a function of the costs and rewards of 
an outcome in relation to an individual’s expectations.  As rewards increase, so does an 
individual’s commitment.  Looking at alumni giving, Weerts and Ronca (2006) propose 
that development officers cultivate donors at an early stage to demonstrate the benefits of 
the relationship.  This cultivation increases the likelihood of a committed relationship and 




 Expectancy theory, from the field of industrial/organizational psychology, 
describes employee motivation in the workplace but has been adapted to describe alumni 
giving.  Vroom (1964), who developed and tested the theory, asserts that employee 
behavior results from conscious decisions designed to maximize pleasure and minimize 
pain.  Decisions are the result of valance (the value of a perceived outcome), 
instrumentality (the belief that performance will yield a desirable outcome), and 
expectancy (the likelihood or strength of the desired outcome).  Although expectancy 
theory focuses on employee motivation, the theory is easily adapted to describe donor 
behavior. 
Weerts and Ronca (2006) assert that alumni donors are motivated in ways similar 
to employees.  Weerts and Ronca (2006) hypothesize that alumni make donations 
because they believe that increased giving will allow a university to achieve a certain 
outcome, the alumni donor values this outcome, and the alumni donor is capable of 
making the commitment.  Expectancy theory is typically combined in a conceptual 
framework with other theoretical approaches, including the theories described above. 
 
Life Cycle Hypothesis 
 Another framework commonly combined with other theoretical perspectives is 
the life cycle hypothesis.  The life cycle hypothesis describes how the wealth of a donor 
can predict the likelihood of making a donation.  The hypothesis indicates that as a 
person’s age increases, so does his or her consumer spending (Olsen, Smith, & Wunnava, 
1989).  Olsen and her colleagues (1989) suggest that the life cycle hypothesis can also 
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describe donor spending on philanthropic causes.  When examining alumni gifts to a 
small liberal arts college using an OLS regression model, Olsen and her colleagues 
(1989) found that the growth rate of donations coincided with the age-income profile and 
became negative at retirement.  That study’s finding is nearly identical to the pattern of 
consumer spending over a life time.   
 
Organization Theory 
 Unlike the theories of alumni giving presented above, organization theories focus 
on institutional behaviors that influence donor behavior.  Although there are many 
organization theories in the broader literature, two organization theories are most used to 
describe alumni giving or donor behavior:  systems theory and resource dependence 
theory.    
 Theories that describe the relationship between organizations and the environment 
are known as systems theories.  Scott (2003) defines “open systems” as organizations that 
are embedded and interact with complexity and ambiguity in an environment.  Systems 
theories describe how organizations respond to environmental demands by processing 
information through the organization’s operating procedures and policies, yielding an 
output (Scott, 2003).  Kelly (1998) posits one systems theory that proposes that 
organizations are embedded in an environment that is part of a larger social, economic, 
and political system that impacts organizational behavior.  In terms of donative support, 
organizations are required to respond to these systems in order to be successful in 
recruiting donations.  Studies that use systems theories typically integrate them with other 
theories of donative support in higher education. 
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Consistent with an open systems perspective, resource dependence theory 
describes how organizations interact in an environment.  Resource dependence theorists 
approach the study of organizations by viewing organizations as coalitions that need to 
leverage power to obtain or maintain resources.  The need to acquire resources creates 
dependencies between organizations and these dependencies constrain organizational 
choice.  Because multiple actors control achievement of a desired outcome (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), organizations are therefore interdependent.  A basic assumption of 
resource dependence theory is that one organization’s actions or consumption of a 
resource affects other organizations.  Therefore, an organization cannot survive if it is not 
responsive to the demand of the other organizations on which it depends or with which it 
competes in its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  When applied to alumni giving, 
resource dependence theory presumes that colleges and universities will change their 
behaviors in order to compete with other universities to enhance donative revenues.   
 
Integrated Approaches 
 Alumni giving behavior is best characterized by integrating multiple theories into 
one comprehensive framework.  Although most studies draw on integrated theories, two 
integrated approaches capture most of the perspectives presented in the alumni giving 
literature and are presented in this section. 
  Volkwein and Parmley (1999) developed a comprehensive model of alumni 
giving, covering most of the perspectives presented in the alumni giving literature.  
Volkwein and Parmley’s (1999) Theoretical Model of Alumni Gift Giving Behavior 
combines concepts from microeconomic principles and the market of higher education, as 
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well as from the individual college outcomes literature.  The model posits that alumni 
giving is determined by demographic characteristics (socioeconomic status, age, gender, 
race), college experiences (undergraduate GPA, major, academic experiences, faculty 
relations, peer relations, intellectual growth), capacity to give (occupation, income assets, 
dependents, highest degree earned), and motivation to give (number of degrees from the 
institution, proximity, appreciation and career values, alumni involvement, satisfaction 
with occupation, perceived institutional need).  Although Volkwein and Parmley (1999) 
did not empirically test their model, other scholars have developed similar integrated 
frameworks to describe alumni giving behaviors. 
Patouillet (2001) introduces a comprehensive theory of alumni giving based upon 
Kelly’s (1998) integrated theory of fundraising for nonprofit organizations.  Patouillet 
(1998) proposes integrating four theories to describe philanthropic fundraising in higher 
education.  In addition to systems theory and social exchange theory described above, 
Patouillet (2001) proposes integrating magic buttons theory and coorientation theory to 
describe alumni giving behavior.  In magic buttons theory, donors are presumed to be 
passive participants in the philanthropic exchange.  Kelly (1998) posits that there is a link 
between giving behavior and a donor’s demographics, cognitions, and attitudes.  The 
optimal combination of these characteristics, or “magic buttons,” would increase the 
probability of a donation.  Coorientation theory presupposes that donors are more likely 
to give when an organization aligns its program or goals to match the donor’s needs.  
Kelly (1998) suggests that fundraising is optimized when the needs of the donor match 
the needs of the organization.  Patouillet (2001) notes that by combining systems, social 
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exchange, magic buttons, and coorientation theories, scholars can develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of alumni giving. 
Patouillet (2001) tests these integrated theories of alumni giving in a study that 
sought to understand the difference between alumni association donors and alumni 
association non-donors.  Using a survey of 1,200 University of Pittsburgh alumni, 
Patouillet (2001) found that the survey responses were consistent with all but magic 
buttons theory.  Although his study provides some support of the theories advanced by 
Kelly (1998), Patouillet (2001) focused on only one institution and did not use 
appropriate statistical techniques, such as factor analysis, to verify that the constructs 
measured were valid measures.  Additional studies are required to validate the theories 
that Patouillet (2001) proposes. 
 
Empirical Studies on Alumni Giving 
The alumni giving literature utilizes a diversity of theoretical frameworks and 
methods to describe donor behavior.  Some studies are strictly empirical and use 
descriptive statistics to assist development staff in courting donors.  Other studies use 
sophisticated theoretical models and statistical techniques to better understand donative 
support in higher education.  This section presents studies that focus on the most popular 
topics in the alumni giving literature to provide context for this dissertation study.  These 
topics include how donor capacity, tax policy, intercollegiate athletics, individual/donor 




Alumni Giving and Donor Capacity 
Many scholars (Belfield & Beney, 2000; Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995; Clotfelter, 
2003; Grimes & Chressanthis, 1994; Holmes, 2009; Okunade, 1993; Okunade, 1996; 
Weerts & Ronca, 2006; Weerts & Ronca, 2007) have conduced studies to understand the 
impact of a donor’s wealth on the likelihood of making a donation.  Overall, these 
scholars found that a donor’s wealth significantly predicts alumni giving up to retirement 
age. 
In two studies, Okunade (1996) and Okunade and his colleagues (1994) tested the 
life cycle hypothesis among other theories.  In a study of graduate school alumni 
donations using generalized least squares regression, Okunade (1996) found that 
donations of new graduates decrease at first, but increase as the graduates’ wealth 
increases.  Income effects from higher-level professional and doctoral degrees also 
predicted higher levels of giving.  In a second study, Okunade and his colleagues (1994) 
studied the “age-donation” profile of donor alumni at a large public research university.  
Using a pooled random sample survey and regression, Okunade and his colleagues 
(1994) found that growth rates increase throughout a life span but begin to decline at age 
52, which falls short of the typical retirement age.  Although these two studies provide 
evidence supporting the life cycle hypothesis, the findings may not be generalizable to 
other institutions because they draw data from only one institution. 
Bristol (1990) found slightly different results in an atheoretical study using 
another institution to examine the collective giving of a cohort of graduates over time.  
Using descriptive statistics, Bristol (1990) demonstrates that a spike in giving levels 
occurs at regular intervals following the graduation year of a cohort of students.  Bristol 
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(1990) surmises that these increases in collective giving correspond with campus events 
put on by the development or alumni affairs office of an institution.  Typically, the spikes 
in alumni giving correspond with the 25th or 50th class reunions of the graduating class, 
with higher donations for higher-numbered reunions.  Bristol found that the class year 
predicted increased giving:  The longer the student was out of school, the higher the 
giving. 
 Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) also found support for the life cycle hypothesis 
when examining another research question.  In their economic model of giving, Bruggink 
and Siddiqui (1995) included alumni age as a variable when modeling alumni giving.  
They found a 5% increase in giving for every one-year increase in age, even after 
controlling for a donor’s income.  Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) conclude that as donors 
get older they become more generous, adding to the evidence that donor capacity should 
be included in integrated models for alumni giving. 
 
Alumni Giving and Tax Policy 
Donor capacity and wealth can also be influenced by federal and state tax policy.  
Changes in tax law, therefore, can increase or decrease the likelihood of donations.  A 
number of studies have tested the notion of how tax policies impact philanthropic giving.  
Drezner (2006), for example, demonstrated that tax cuts in 2001 for the wealthiest 
population had the effect of reducing philanthropic giving.  Using descriptive statistics, 
Drezner (2006) demonstrates that reducing taxes for the wealthy increases the costs of 
making a donation for these donors.  Wealthy donors are therefore less likely to make  
donation when taxes are reduced.   
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Several other scholars (Holmes, 2009; Sargeant, Hilton, & Wymer, 2006; Smith 
& Ehrenberg, 2003) provide evidence to support the relationship between tax policy and 
donation levels.  Utilizing concepts from economics, social exchange, and public good 
theories, Holmes (2009), for example, sought to understand if prestige or charitable tax 
deductions impacted alumni giving at a selective private liberal arts institution.  Holmes 
(2009) utilized probit and tobit regression models to examine 15 years of data on alumni 
donations, controlling for other determinates of alumni giving in his model.  Holmes 
(2009) found that wealthy alumni who live in states that allow charitable tax deductions 
were more likely to give, as were alumni who were more proximate to the institution.   
Holmes’ (2009) study also included findings on the relationship between prestige 
and alumni giving.  While it focused on individual instead of institutional characteristics, 
Holmes’ (2009) study also found that as athletic and academic prestige increases, so do 
alumni donations and younger alumni are more likely to be responsive to prestige than 
older alumni.  That study, however did not examine the relationship between alumni 
giving and prestige at public universities or across time periods. 
 
Alumni Giving and Intercollegiate Athletics 
Similar to Holmes’ (2009) study, a large portion of the literature on alumni giving 
focuses on the effects of intercollegiate athletics on alumni giving.  Although these 
studies are atheoretical, they hypothesize that success in athletics increases alumni 
giving.  Brewer, Gates, and Goldman (2002) define success in intercollegiate athletics in 
terms of national ranking polls such as AP and USA Today/ESPN; and appearances in 
bowl games. The findings in the literature on the relationship between success in athletics 
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and alumni giving, however, are mixed.  Some studies (Grimes & Chressanthis, 1994; 
Holmes, Meditz, & Sommers, 2008; Rhoads & Gerking, 2000; Tucker, 2004) have 
shown that the success of an institution’s athletic program increases giving, while other 
studies (Gaski & Etzel, 1984; Harrison, Mitchell, & Peterson, 1995; Meer & Rosen, 
2008; Meer & Rosen, In Press; Sigelman & Carter, 1979; Turner, Meserve, & Bowen, 
2001) have found little predictive value.   
 
Alumni Giving and Individual Characteristics 
Some studies on donative support of higher education seek to understand what 
factors contribute to predict higher levels of giving without the use of theory.  Monks 
(2003), for example, sought to identify individual characteristics, observable on campus, 
that are correlated with alumni giving, to assist development administrators in increasing 
donative revenues.  Using survey data from 28 private nonprofit higher education 
institutions and tobit and logit regression models, Monks (2003) identified multiple 
individual characteristics that predicted alumni giving.  These include individual and 
household income, gender, race, marriage status, type and amount of financial aid, and 
citizen status.  The largest predictor of alumni giving in that study was an individual’s 
satisfaction with his or her undergraduate experience.   
Without using a clear theoretical framework, Marr and her colleagues (2005) 
found similar results in their study on the relationship between student financial aid and 
alumni giving.  Using an alumni survey at Vanderbilt University and tobit and logit 
regression models, Marr and her colleagues (2005) found that the type of financial aid 
received increases the probability of alumni giving.  Receiving need-based loans as an 
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undergraduate predicts lower probabilities of giving but receiving need-based and merit 
scholarships increases the likelihood of giving.  The amount of the aid explains less about 
the probability of a donation than the type of financial aid does.  Additional predictors 
increasing the probability of a donation include parental income, an alumna/us’ 
experience while an undergraduate, affiliation with a Greek organization, affiliation with 
athletics, academic performance, and academic major.  Although Marr and her colleagues 
(2005) used the appropriate method to answer the research questions, they transformed 
all of their continuous variables to dummy variables because of measurement error, so the 
results of this study should be interpreted with caution. 
 Clotfelter (2003) utilized concepts from economics, life cycle, and social 
exchange theories to describe the factors that increase alumni donations at elite private 
higher education institutions.  Using four logistic regression models and data from 34 
private colleges and universities, Clotfelter (2003) demonstrated that level of income, 
institutional selectivity, and positive experiences as an undergraduate all positively 
predicted alumni giving.  Although it is one of the few multi-institutional studies in the 
literature, the study is limited in that it only focuses on private institutions and four time 
periods. 
Using concepts from economic, life cycle, and public good theories, Bruggink and 
Siddiqui (1995) propose a model where alumni are motivated by a social sense of 
obligation (altruism), a payback from services previously provided (reciprocity), and 
improved recognition for the donation or special privileges (direct benefit).  Using a 
multiple regression model with cross-sectional survey data from a liberal arts institution, 
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Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) found that income, age, affiliation with a Greek 
organization, and engineering majors positively predicted giving. 
Overall, the studies that seek to define individual characteristics that predict 
giving are useful for practitioners and development officers in identifying donors.  For 
researchers, more institution-level models and panel studies are required to understand 
the influence of selectivity on alumni giving at public research universities.  
 
Alumni Giving and Development Spending/Solicitations 
Beyond individual characteristics, institutional characteristics or behaviors have 
also been found to influence alumni giving.  Using social exchange theory, Harrison and 
his colleagues (1995) used a two-stage least squares regression model to determine if 
institutional expenditures on activities designed to recognize donors influence alumni 
giving.  Harrison and his colleagues (1995) found that development costs related to 
recognition did predict levels of alumni giving.  Additionally, Harrison and his colleagues 
(1995) found that other factors also predict higher alumni giving including an alumna/us’ 
positive experiences as an undergraduate, Greek participation as a student, and full-time 
student status.  Although that study was one of the few with many institutions 
represented, the study did not examine changes over time. 
In one organizational study, Gottfried and Johnson (2006) sought to understand if 
devoting resources toward solicitations increased alumni giving.  Using a panel dataset 
between 1994 and 2005 and 2,986 public and private universities, Gottfried and Johnson 
(2006) sought to resolve the debate in economics regarding the effects of solicitation on 
alumni giving.  Using fixed effects regression, Gottfried and Johnson (2006) provide 
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evidence that colleges and universities that increase solicitation efforts will increase 
alumni giving, with elite institutions having the most success.  Although that study has a 
higher representation of institutions than other studies on alumni giving do, it combined 
private and public institutions. 
One study proposed an economic-based model consistent with resource 
dependence theory.  Harrison (1995) proposes an economic model where colleges seek to 
maximize success through increased fundraising.  Analyzing data at 18 public and private 
universities over three years, Harrison (1995) finds that institutions that allocate scarce 
resources to fundraising, alumni relations, and other activities increase participation rates.  
In another study, Harrison and his colleagues (1995) found similar results.  Using two-
stage least squares regression and data from 13 private and 5 public colleges and 
universities, Harrison et al. (1995) found that increased expenses on development 
activities also increased alumni giving.  These two studies show that colleges and 
universities devote resources toward development activities in order to increase revenues 
from donative support (Harrison, 1995; Harrison et al., 1995).   
Results from a similar study provide support for the relationship between 
development spending and alumni giving.  In his study of 81 public research universities, 
Harris (1990) also found that development activities predict fundraising success.  
Funding of development activities was more important than the structure of the 
development office in increasing donations.  More current research, however, has focused 




Alumni Giving and Engagement/Involvement 
 An emerging trend in the alumni giving literature focuses on the donor’s 
relationship with the college or university.  Weerts and Ronca (2006) sought to design a 
conceptual model that would identify the characteristics that would encourage current 
donors to increase their levels of giving.  Using social exchange, investment, and 
expectancy theories to describe a public research institution, Weerts and Ronca (2006) 
used an ordinal logistic regression in their model.  Weerts and Ronca (2006) found 
support for the model, with higher age, being male, capacity to give, and social 
engagement as an undergraduate student being positive predictors of increased giving.  
The study is limited in that it only focuses on one institution. 
In another study, Weerts and Ronca (2007) designed a conceptual model using 
concepts from social exchange, expectancy, life cycle, and investment theories to 
describe the characteristics that encourage alumni to volunteer for, donate to, or 
otherwise support (such as through political advocacy) a public research institution.  
Using logistic regression, Weerts and Ronca (2007) found that alumni who have some 
current involvement with the institution in some way are more likely to give.  
Additionally, alumni who are older and more established in their careers are the most 
likely to get involved with their previous institution through volunteering, donations, or 
support.     
Sun and his colleagues (2007) also provide evidence that donor involvement in 
the institution influences alumni giving.  Sun and his colleagues (2007) developed a 
conceptual framework using concepts from economic, public good, social exchange, 
equity, and organizational theories to identify the factors that triggered alumni donation 
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behavior at a Midwestern public university.  Utilizing a multivariate regression model, 
Sun et al. (2007) found current alumni experiences with the institution, alumni 
motivation, student involvement in extracurricular activities, and student relationships all 
significantly predicted alumni giving, controlling for other factors.  Although Sun and his 
colleagues (2007) utilized regression to analyze alumni giving, their study is limited by 
the nature of data drawn from one institution and does not address change over time.  
Gaier (2005) utilized concepts from economics and impact models in order to 
understand if alumni satisfaction increased the probability of a donation at a large state 
university.  According to Gaier (2005), impact models describe two social systems that 
shape an undergraduate student’s experience:  relationships in the academic system and 
the social system.  Using logistic regression analysis and data from 1,608 alumni, Gaier 
(2005) found that alumni satisfaction with their undergraduate experiences and their 
current involvement significantly increase the probability of making a donation. 
Although an emerging trend in alumni giving studies focuses on the donor’s 
experience and relationship with the college or university, few studies focus on 
institutional behaviors (such as prestige maximization) and relationships among variables 
over time.  This dissertation study attempts to address some of these limitations by using 




Andreoni (2006) notes that philanthropy is a puzzling concept for economists.  It 
is not easy to accommodate an unselfish act in a field based on the study of self-interested 
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behavior.  Neoclassical and other economic theories cannot adequately explain 
philanthropy and voluntary support.  Neoclassical economic theories of giving presume 
that donors make rational decisions with perfect information, so that any charitable 
contributions benefit the well-being of the donor (Andreoni, 2006).  Halfpenny (1999) 
presents three assumptions of neoclassical economic theories.  First, donors have a set of 
unchanging preferences used to improve their well-being, and their goal is to expend 
resources to fulfill these preferences.  Second, donors selfishly seek to maximize their 
well-being; they act rationally with full information to maximize benefits for minimum 
costs.  Third, markets control the transactions among donors and markets tend to reach 
equilibrium to meet the demands of the goods and services available.  Andreoni (2006) 
and Halfpenny (1999), however, state that neoclassical economic perspectives do not 
accurately describe actual donor behavior in the market.   
Although scholars (Andreoni, 1990; Andreoni, 2006; Halfpenny, 1999) indicate 
that neoclassical economic theories do not accurately describe donor behavior, some 
studies show that some donors have self-interested motivations.  For example, some 
studies note that donors that receive naming rights (Harbaugh, 1998b), recognition for a 
donation (Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995; Harbaugh, 1998b; Yoo & Harrison, 1989), or other 
special privilege (Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995) are more likely to make a donation.  These 
studies, however, do not exclusively adhere to assumptions of neoclassical economics.  
Economists have modified neoclassical economic theories by introducing other 
assumptions that more accurately describe market behavior and the environment.   
When summarizing the development of donor behavior in economic theory, 
Halfpenny (1999) states that neoclassical theories have been recast to combine altruistic 
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motives with some level of self-interested donor behavior.  Early neoclassical theories are 
inconsistent with most of the theories of alumni giving presented above.  Halfpenny 
(1999) states that alumni giving theories, such as those from sociology, can be easily 
assimilated into economic analysis.  When incorporated into an economic framework, 
theories such as public good theory, social exchange theory, life cycle hypothesis, and 
others may help to explain deviations from expected economic behavior.   
  
Summary 
This section presented the theoretical perspectives used to describe alumni donor 
behavior and motivation.  Many theories are available in the literature to describe alumni 
giving, including public good theory, social exchange theory, expectancy theory, the life 
cycle hypothesis, the investment model, and organization theory.  Most of these theories 
are consistent with modern economic perspectives and are typically integrated to develop 
a comprehensive understanding of donor behavior.  Although much research has been 
conducted, especially focusing on the impact of donor capacity, tax policy, athletics, 
individual characteristics, development spending, and alumni involvement on donor 
behavior, few studies have been conducted at the organizational level or have focused on 
changes in institutional selectivity and alumni giving at public universities over time.  
The next section presents another economic framework describing the influence of 
selectivity on alumni giving. 
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Economics of Prestige and Alumni Giving in Higher Education 
Several researchers (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; 
Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) use economic perspectives to examine the 
influence of prestige or institutional selectivity on philanthropic contributions such as 
alumni giving.  Rose-Ackerman (1996) provides an economic framework that explains 
why individuals give to charitable causes.  One aspect of this framework provides a 
rationale for the relationship between philanthropic giving and prestige.  Rose-Ackerman 
(1996) maintains that, when compared to other organizations, educational organizations 
yield much higher rates of philanthropic giving in relation to governmental spending.  
She speculates that educational organizations (including higher education institutions) 
receive higher levels of giving because donors have closer personal ties to such 
organizations (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  In higher education, alumni who were once 
students enrolled in a higher education institution may be more invested in the success or 
failure of the college or university. 
In addition to a donor’s close personal ties to an organization, Rose-Ackerman 
(1996) notes that prestige, among other factors, can motivate donors to make 
contributions to a philanthropic cause.  When describing donative support in higher 
education, James (1990) contends that, because of the close relationship between an 
alumni donor and the college or university, the donor’s own prestige is enhanced as a 
college or university enhances its prestige.  This section reviews the literature that 
discusses the connection between prestige or selectivity and alumni giving. 
Extending Rose-Ackerman’s (1996) work, Martin (2005) proposed an economic 
framework to help explain donor intent and the philanthropic market as applied to higher 
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education.  Martin’s (2005) model proposes that donative revenues increase the 
institution’s quality reputation (defined as student selectivity) and decreases the 
institution’s solicitation costs.  High educational quality, therefore, is a concern of 
wealthy donors.  If high quality students are admitted to an institution, it signals that the 
institution is of high quality and it increases the likelihood of a donation from a wealthy 
donor.  Likewise, if a donor who contributes is an alumna/us, it signals to prospective 
students that the institution is of high quality and increases the likelihood that high 
quality students would enroll (Martin, 2005).  As a result, Martin (2005) proposes that 
high quality institutions fundraise, regardless of whether it maximizes revenues, in order 
to increase quality.  This economic model, however, has yet to be tested. 
Utilizing economic utility concepts, Leslie and Ramey (1988) provide evidence 
that alumni donors are motivated by the prestige of a college or university when making 
philanthropic contributions as well.  Leslie and Ramey (1988) used an economic utility 
model to explain how donors gain satisfaction as a result of prestige, power, or 
recognition.  Using a pooled sample of public and private Research I universities and 
covering two years (1977 and 1980) through an OLS regression analysis, Leslie and 
Ramey (1988) found that alumni, non-alumni, and organizational donors maximize 
relative satisfaction, otherwise known in economics as utility, in different ways.  Alumni 
are largely motivated by the prestige of an institution with regard to their giving 
behaviors, whereas other donors had other reasons for their gifts.  Alumni from 
prestigious institutions also appear to give more because of the higher income of 
graduates from those institutions.  One limitation of this analysis is that it covers only two 
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years of data and thus does not take into account changes over time in the relationship 
between prestige and alumni giving.   
Using concepts from the economics of nonprofit organizations, Cunningham and 
Cochi-Ficano (2002) also found a relationship between prestige, measured by student 
selectivity, and alumni giving.  Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) examined 
determinates of alumni giving to private four- and two-year institutions.  To provide 
evidence of causation between prestige and alumni giving, Cunningham and Cochi-
Ficano (2002) lagged the prestige variable by 13 years.  Their results indicate that 
measures of selectivity predict future levels of giving.  Although the study appears to 
confirm a cause and effect relationship between prestige and alumni giving, the study has 
a number of limitations.  It is not clear, for example, why a 13-year lag was ideal for 
determining the relationship, nor is there any theoretical justification for the development 
of the composite measures.  Additionally, the study does not examine what occurred 
among the predictors of alumni giving during the intervening years. 
Another study extends the work of Cunningham and Cochi-Fiano (2002) and 
Leslie and Ramey (1988) by examining prestige (student selectivity) and the influence of 
state appropriations on donative support (including alumni giving) at all public four-year 
colleges and universities.  Utilizing concepts from economics, sociology, and political 
science, Cheslock and Gianneschi (2008) examine the impact of declining state 
appropriations on alumni giving.  Cheslock and Gianneschi’s (2008) model asserts that 
the amount of philanthropic giving is not evenly distributed across institutions due to an 
institution’s selectivity.  Using a fixed effects regression model and 11 years of panel 
data, they show that donors are most likely to give to selective institutions that already 
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possess significant resources.  These selective institutions have a competitive advantage 
over other institutions in securing alumni donations.  Cheslock and Gianneschi’s (2008) 
statistical model, however, does not account for lagged effects of alumni giving. 
In their study of the sources and uses of alumni giving at 60 private selective 
colleges and universities, Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) also examined prestige as 
measured by U.S. News and World Report ranking and alumni giving.  Ehrenberg and 
Smith (2003) developed an economic utility-maximizing model to describe differences 
by type of institution in the types of support received, and how the philanthropic support 
is used by private selective colleges and universities.  Using 31 years of annual data in a 
fixed effects regression model, Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) found that wealthier and 
more prestigious universities (as measured by U.S. News tier rank) are able to focus more 
of their efforts on fundraising for enhancing their endowments rather than for current 
expenditures.  Additionally, higher levels of wealth are associated with higher levels of 
giving from all sources, including alumni.  Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) contend that 
these factors increase the concentration of wealth among the wealthiest private colleges 
and universities.  That study did not address the relationship between alumni giving and 
prestige at public research universities. 
Additionally, although prior research (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Leslie & 
Ramey, 1988; Martin, 2005; Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008) is valuable in illustrating a 
possible relationship between alumni giving and selectivity, these studies do not examine 
how changes in a higher education institution, over time, influence changes in alumni 
giving.  An alternative model is required to address this limitation in the literature.  The 
next section reviews the literature on prestige and alumni giving as it relates to economics 
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of nonprofit organizations.  This literature is used to build a conceptual framework to 
examine the relationship between alumni giving and selectivity over time at public 
research universities. 
 
II. Economics of Nonprofit Organizations and Higher Education 
 This section reviews the economics literature on nonprofit organizations as it 
relates to public higher education.  Higher education is an industry dominated by 
nonprofit organizations.  According to the American Council on Education (2007), 
nonprofit colleges and universities accounted for nearly 80% of all degree-granting 
institutions and 95% of the enrollment in American higher education in 2004.  Industries 
dominated by nonprofit organizations operate under different market dynamics than 
industries dominated by for-profit organizations (Weisbrod, 1988).  As a result, 
economists have noted that the economic behavior of colleges and universities is difficult 
to characterize, calling it “awkward” (Winston, 1999) or “curious” (Clotfelter, 1999) 
economics.   The literature on the economics of nonprofit organizations provides 
explanations for why nonprofit higher education institutions behave differently than their 
for-profit counterparts.  Primarily, nonprofit organizations, including not-for-profit higher 
education institutions, do not maximize profits.  This section describes the economics of 
nonprofit organizations and why these organizations are different than for-profit 
organizations.  This section then defines the economic concept of utility to illustrate the 
differences in administrator behaviors at nonprofit and for-profit organizations.  Finally, 
this section will introduce a utility-maximizing theory to describe why nonprofit 
universities seek to enhance prestige. 
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Economics of Nonprofit Organizations and Utility 
The broader literature on the economics of nonprofit organizations provides 
explanations for why nonprofit organizations exhibit behaviors that differ from for-profit 
organizations.  Many scholars (Hansmann, 1981; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Lee, 
1971; Newhouse, 1970; Raines & Leathers, 2003) introduce the economic concept of 
utility to illustrate differences between nonprofit and for-profit organizations.  The 
concept of utility is used in economics to explain the relative satisfaction derived from 
the consumption of goods and services by society, an organization, or an individual, such 
as an administrator in an organization.  With regard to the administrators, relative 
satisfaction may be derived from a combination of salary, prestige, power, job security, 
job satisfaction, recognition, and professional standing (Lee, 1971; Lee, Stevens, & 
Wallace, 1975).  Lee (1971) notes that this economic concept allows for the possibility 
that an administrator’s goals can be in misalignment with goals of the organization.  The 
starkest difference between nonprofit and for-profit organizations is the different reward 
structures in place that allow administrators to maximize utility.   
Scholars (James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Newhouse, 1970) that develop 
theoretical models to describe utility-maximizing behaviors posit that utility can be 
increased by improving the quality or the quantity of goods or services produced (James 
& Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Newhouse, 1970).  If an administrator of a revenue-generating 
organization chooses to maximize utility by increasing production, she may increase the 
organization’s revenues.  Consistent with this model, many for-profit organizations 
choose to maximize utility by increasing profits brought about by increasing revenue 
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and/or minimizing costs.  Maximizing utility by increasing the quantity of products at the 
expense of quality, however, is atypical in nonprofit organizations (Hansmann, 1981; 
James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Parente & Van Horn 2006; 
Valentinov, 2006; Weisbrod, 1988). 
According to many economists (Hansmann, 1981; James & Rose-Ackerman, 
1986; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Parente & Van Horn 2006; Valentinov, 2006; 
Weisbrod, 1988), most nonprofit organizations choose to maximize utility by increasing 
the quality of the organization’s products or services.  To summarize the economic 
literature (see Hansmann, 1981, James & Rose-Ackerman, 1985; Valentinov, 2006; 
Weisbrod, 1988), there are three reasons why nonprofit organizations choose to increase 
quality rather than quantity.  First, nonprofit organizations typically operate in markets 
where the consumer cannot accurately evaluate the quality of a product or service.  
Because administrators have no incentive to maximize profits, nonprofit organizations 
operate in markets where consumers trust that nonprofit organizations will produce high 
quality goods or services (Hansmann, 1981; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 
1988).  Second, administrators at nonprofit organizations tend to have values aligned with 
the goals of the organization.  James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) contend that whereas 
administrators of for-profit organizations maximize utility with higher salaries through 
increasing profits, administrators of nonprofit organizations typically earn lower salaries 
and gain utility by maximizing the values and goals they share with the organization.  
Any enhancement to the organization itself, via increasing the quality of its products or 
organizational prestige, enhances the administrator’s utility (James & Rose-Ackerman, 
1986; Newhouse, 1970).  Third, Hansmann (1981) contends that nonprofit organizations 
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are bound by a “non-distribution constraint,” where surplus revenues cannot be 
distributed to owners, including shareholders.  As a result of this restriction, several 
scholars (Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Valentinov, 2006) contend that administrators of 
nonprofit organizations have more discretion as to how to maximize utility beyond 
enhancing revenues.  Because administrators of nonprofit organizations cannot be 
evaluated for profit-maximizing behaviors, quality becomes a key criterion for good 
performance.  As a result of these three factors, nonprofit organization administrators 
have an inherent preference for increasing quality to maximize utility. 
James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) assert that although administrators of nonprofit 
organizations choose to maximize utility through quality, there are limits to realizing this 
goal.  James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) note that nonprofit organizations are constrained 
by capital, making it difficult for administrators to focus on quality alone.  Nonprofit 
organizations, therefore, use charitable donations or revenue-generating sub-units to both 
increase quality and become more competitive in the market (James & Rose-Ackerman, 
1986).  Some nonprofit organizations without any capital aren’t able to maximize utility 
through quality and need to increase quantity for survival. 
Hansmann (1981) and Weisbrod (1988) observe another challenge to maximizing 
quality in nonprofit organizations.  Hansmann (1981) and Weisbrod (1988) observe that 
many nonprofit organizations produce products and services for which quality cannot be 
measured.  In the absence of quality measures, several researchers (Horwitz & Nichols, 
2007; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Parente & Van Horn, 2006) state that nonprofit 
organizations prefer to enhance status or prestige. 
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The absence of quality measures has been observed in the higher education 
literature.  Birnbaum (1988) and Cohen and March (1986) note that quality is difficult to 
measure in higher education.  Other scholars (Lee, 1971; Parente & Van Horn, 2006) 
contend that some nonprofit organizations increase the variety and complexity of the 
inputs available to enhance the organization rather than the actual quality of the product 
or service.  Using economic perspectives on the nonprofit organization and building on 
the work of Garvin (1980) and Winston (1999), the next section describes a conceptual 
model of nonprofit public research universities that maximize utility by enhancing 
prestige.   
 
Economics of Nonprofit Colleges and Universities 
Utilizing a theoretical framework described in the broader economics literature on 
nonprofit organizations, one may be able to examine how nonprofit colleges and 
universities maximize prestige instead of profits.  In summary, administrators in public 
universities maximize utility by increasing institutional prestige, depending on the 
financial resources available.  Many public colleges and universities make an effort to 
increase revenue from sources such as alumni to subsidize investments in prestige.  This 
section reviews the literature that discusses a possible relationship between alumni giving 
and prestige. 
 Garvin (1980) proposes an economic model of prestige in higher education that 
can be utilized to understand the relationship between alumni giving and prestige.  
Building on the work of Thorsten Veblen (1957/1918), Garvin’s (1980) economic model 
of university behavior posits that college faculty and administrators seek to maximize 
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utility through increasing prestige.  Garvin (1980) proposes a utility-maximizing model 
similar to the economic models of nonprofit organizations to explain college and 
university behavior.  Garvin (1980) states that goals that are shared by both 
administrators and faculty are the ones likely to be pursued, as long as the goals also 
ensure the university’s future survival.  According to Garvin’s (1980) model, utility is 
maximized in three ways:  prestige through research productivity (in terms of the number 
and/or quality of faculty in each academic department), student quality, and number of 
students.  By developing a reputation that focuses on quality, colleges and universities 
widen their markets to better compete for both students and funds (Garvin, 1980).   
Garvin’s (1980) model suggests higher education institutions are faced with a 
quality/quantity tradeoff.  Similar to models of nonprofit organizations described by other 
scholars (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Parente & Van Horn, 
2006), Garvin’s (1980) model posits that colleges and universities prefer to maximize 
utility through enhancing prestige.  In Garvin’s (1980) model, the concept of prestige 
dominates, with an emphasis on faculty research productivity.  Higher education 
institutions that make an effort to increase prestige, but are capital constrained, may need 
to generate additional revenues by increasing enrollment.  However, according to Garvin 
(1980), increasing enrollment may lower the proportion of talented students and reduce 
the likelihood that talented faculty will be attracted to the institution.     
Garvin (1980) also maintains that some universities operate under a “service 
tradition” and maximize utility by increasing aggregate enrollments.  Institutions that 
operate under a service tradition are guided by a mission to increase access to higher 
education.  Consequently, other institutions may prefer to maximize utility through 
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prestige, but are forced to maximize utility by increasing enrollments because these 
universities do not have enough resources.   
Garvin’s (1980) model differs from other utility models of nonprofit 
organizations.  Most scholars (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Parente & Van Horn, 2006) suggest that only administrators 
in leadership positions maximize utility.  Compared to others, in Garvin’s (1980) model, 
faculty play a prominent role, primarily because no simple hierarchy exists in higher 
education institutions.  The role of faculty is enhanced so that the institution pursues 
goals in line with both faculty and administrative leaders.   
Although Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing model is the most appropriate for 
describing prestige in higher education institutions, it does have a disadvantage.  Garvin’s 
(1980) model fails to recognize complex decision-making processes at colleges and 
universities.  James (1990) argues that the utility-maximizing process is complicated by 
complex decision making, imperfect information, and goal ambiguity.  Complex decision 
making is even more acute in four-year colleges and universities (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972).  Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) describe higher 
education institutions as “organized anarchies” because they decentralize operations 
allowing for conflicting goals to coexist.  As a result of this decentralization, utility 
maximization is specific to the goals and managers of each unit of the college or 
university.  However, James (1990) contends that when utility is maximized in one unit, 
it contributes to collectively maximize utility for all units.   
Despite this disadvantage, Garvin’s (1980) model captures concepts from the 
nonprofit economic literature in his theory.  His model is consistent with other models 
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(Geiger, 2004; Hansmann, 1981; Horwitz & Nichols, 2007; Hoxby, 1997; Lee, 1971; 
Newhouse, 1970; Raines & Leathers, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004; Weisbrod, 1988; Winston, 1999; Zemsky et al., 2005) of nonprofit 
organizations.  First, several scholars (Hansmann, 1981; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Valentinov, 2006) have noted that the “non-distribution constraint” in nonprofit 
organizations does not provide incentives to maximize profits.  In Garvin’s (1980) model, 
the non-distribution constraint changes the motivation of faculty and administrators to 
focus on goals that don’t include minimizing costs or increasing profits.  The non-
distribution constraint changes the goals of faculty and administrators to maximize 
prestige instead of profits (Hansmann, 1981; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Lee, 1971; 
Raines & Leathers, 2003; Weisbrod, 1988). 
Second, other scholars (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; 
Winston, 1999) note that, for many nonprofit selective higher education institutions, there 
are more applicants than there are slots available in the admissions process.  This “excess 
demand” in certain segments of the higher education market gives faculty and 
administrators discretion to make decisions that focus on prestige rather than consumer 
preferences (Hoxby, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Winston, 1999).  Excess demand 
in segments of the higher education market is also consistent with concepts that 
characterize Garvin’s (1980) model. 
Third, Winston (1999) notes that higher education institutions do not rely on a 
single source of funding.  Higher education organizations are subsidized from a number 
of external sources, including state and federal governments, charitable donations, and 
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commercial enterprises, in addition to tuition.  In Garvin’s (1980) model, these external 
subsidies fund goals that may enhance prestige but may not be profitable.    
In summary, Garvin (1980) proposes a utility-maximizing model of university 
behavior to explain the motivations of faculty and administrators who maximize utility by 
pursuing goals that increase prestige.  Scholars writing about nonprofit organizations 
(Hansmann, 1981; Horwitz & Nichols, 2007; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996; Weisbrod, 1988) and nonprofit higher education institutions (Geiger, 
2004; Hoxby, 1997; Raines & Leathers, 2003; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Winston, 
1999; Zemsky et al., 2005) provide concurrent validity that Garvin’s (1980) economic 
model is useful when examining college and university behavior.  The next section of this 
chapter will discuss Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing model within the context of the 
literature on prestige in higher education.  
 
III. Prestige in Nonprofit Higher Education Institutions 
 Some aspects of the literature on prestige in higher education institutions are 
consistent with Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing model.  The studies on prestige in 
higher education fall into five broad sets of theories:  (1) utility theories, (2) market 
theories, (3) input-output theories, (4) resource dependence theories, and (5) theories on 
institutional isomorphism.  This section discusses the definition of prestige in higher 
education, summarizes each of these bodies of literature, and describes how they intersect 
with the concept of prestige in Garvin’s (1980) model. 
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Context: Definitions of Prestige in the Higher Education Literature 
 A review of the higher education literature reveals that prestige is discussed from 
the perspective of perceived student quality (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Cyrenne 
& Grant, 2009; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b), faculty research productivity (Brewer et al., 2002; Cyrenne 
& Grant, 2009; Dey et al., 1997; Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Melguizo & Strober, 2007; 
Milem et al., 2000; Morphew & Baker, 2004; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006), success in 
intercollegiate athletics (Brewer et al., 2002; Tucker & Amato, 1993), and college and 
university magazine rankings (Ehrenberg, 2002a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999; O'Meara, 
2007).  Scholars have discussed prestige-seeking behaviors among higher education 
institutions using many concepts, such as academic drift (Berdahl, 1985), upper drift 
(Aldersley, 1995), academic ratcheting (Zemsky et al., 2005), institutional isomorphism 
(Dey et al., 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Milem et al., 2000; Morphew, 2002), and 
striving (O'Meara, 2007).  This section presents these concepts and how they are 
discussed along with prestige in the higher education literature.   
The first conception of prestige used by many scholars (Brewer et al., 2002; 
Cyrenne & Grant, 2009; Dey et al., 1997; Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Melguizo & Strober, 
2007; Milem et al., 2000; Morphew & Baker, 2004; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006) is 
faculty research productivity.  Faculty research productivity has been measured using 
faculty quality (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006), faculty salary 
level (Melguizo & Strober, 2007), research and development expenditures (Brewer et al., 
2002; Dolan & Schmidt, 1994), and the number of research publications produced (Dey 
et al., 1997; Milem et al., 2000; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006).  Several researchers (Dey 
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et al., 1997; Milem et al., 2000) justify the use of research productivity as a measure of 
prestige by showing that comprehensive master’s and liberal arts institutions are 
gradually changing to emulate doctoral research institutions.  In the higher education 
literature, some scholars utilize the research definition of prestige when defining their 
conceptual models (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Garvin, 1980; Porter & Toutkoushian, 
2006).  Faculty research productivity is used as a primary measure of prestige in Garvin’s 
(1980) model for university behavior. 
A second conception of prestige used by researchers (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; 
McDonough, Antonio, Walpole, & Pérez, 1998; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 
1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) is student quality.  Geiger (2004), for example, 
defines student quality in terms of student selectivity when describing competition among 
private selective institutions.  Selectivity has been defined using standardized test scores 
in the admissions process and admissions yield rates (Hoxby, 1997; McDonough et al., 
1998; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b).  
Scholars (Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & 
Ehrenberg, 1999b) justify the use of student quality as a measure of prestige by 
demonstrating that many colleges and universities are competing in a national market to 
attract talented students. According to several scholars (Meredith, 2004; Monks & 
Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b), institutions appear to be increasing 
admissions standards in order to increase student quality by increasing the number of 
high ability students.  Geiger (2004) calls the competition for high ability students the 
“selectivity sweepstakes,” while Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy (2005) call it the 
“admissions arms race.”  Based on student selectivity, prestige is mostly examined in 
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studies that focus on the higher education admissions market (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 
1997), the college admissions process (McDonough, 2003; McDonough et al., 1998), or 
college and university rankings (Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & 
Ehrenberg, 1999b).  Garvin (1980) also recognizes student selectivity as a measure of 
prestige in his study, positing that high quality faculty wish to surround themselves with 
high ability students. 
The third conception of prestige that scholars (Ehrenberg, 2002a; Meredith, 2004; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999; O'Meara, 2007) use prominently in the literature is college 
and university rankings publications such as U.S. News and World Report.  The magazine 
rankings use a combination of factors to determine an institution’s rank relative to other 
colleges and universities.  The U.S. News rankings, for example, include student 
selectivity, faculty resources, graduation and retention rates, financial resources, alumni 
giving, graduation rate performance, and a survey of academic reputation in their 
methodology for ranking colleges and universities (Ehrenberg, 2002a).  Monks and 
Ehrenberg (1999a) and Meredith (2004) demonstrate that there are negative 
consequences to admissions outcomes and finances if an institution’s U.S. News ranking 
falls.  As a result, college administrators are very sensitive and responsive to changes in 
these rankings publications (Machung, 1998).  Although the U.S. News rankings account 
for seven measures of institutional performance, several scholars (Grunig, 1997; 
Pascarella et al., 2006; Webster, 2001) have shown that the highest correlate of an 
institution’s U.S. News ranking is SAT/ACT score.  Despite the fact that some scholars 
(Meredith, 2004; Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999) have conducted studies using this 
definition of prestige, most studies examine the individual components that are used in 
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developing these rankings.  Garvin’s (1980) model does not incorporate university 
rankings into his model, but the component measures used to develop the rankings 
(selectivity and research productivity) are consistent with the rankings definition of 
prestige. 
For the purposes of this study, prestige is defined as student quality measured by 
student selectivity (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; 
Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b).  Although 
there is much evidence that student selectivity is a poor predictor of outcomes and future 
student performance (Pascarella, 2001; Pascarella et al., 2006; Pascarella & Terenzini, 
2005; Pike, 2004), it is still viewed as a measure of an institution’s prestige in 
conjunction with faculty research productivity.   Several studies (Ehrenberg, 2002a; 
Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Machung, 1998; Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 
1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b; O'Meara, 2007; Winston, 1999) provide evidence 
that higher education administrators increase the selectivity of their institutions in an 
effort to enhance the prestige of their colleges or universities.  Given the high correlation 
between student selectivity and U.S. News ranking (Grunig, 1997; Pascarella et al., 2006; 
Webster, 2001), it is plausible that alumni have access to this information and may be 
responsive to institutional performance based on selectivity.  As a result, this study 
focuses on prestige using student selectivity as a measure and future studies will be 
needed to examine alumni giving using other conceptions of prestige.  Therefore, 
Garvin’s (1980) model is modified to exclude research productivity which may not be 
easily available to alumni.  The next section summarizes empirical studies on utility-
maximizing models to explain the pursuit of prestige at colleges and universities and 
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provides concurrent evidence supporting the use of Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing 
model. 
 
Prestige and Utility Models 
 In addition to Garvin (1980), other scholars (Lee et al., 1975; Massy & Zemsky, 
1994; Massy & Zemsky, 1997; Melguizo & Strober, 2007) developed utility-maximizing 
models to understand the behavior of nonprofit higher education institutions. This section 
discusses these utility maximization models and contrasts them with Garvin’s (1980) 
model. 
Scholars (Massy & Zemsky, 1994; Massy & Zemsky, 1997; Policy Perspectives, 
1990; Zemsky, Shaman, & Shapiro, 2001; Zemsky et al., 2005) associated with the Pew 
Higher Education Research Program developed a utility-maximizing model to help 
explain the relationship between prestige and administrative costs in colleges and 
universities.  Consistent with Garvin’s (1980) model, Massy and Zemsky’s (1994; 1997) 
model posits that faculty seek to maximize utility by increasing research productivity and 
providing high quality instruction.  Their model also parallels Garvin’s (1980) model by 
connecting the pursuit of prestige to higher education finance.  Massy and Zemsky 
(1994;1997); Zemsky, Shaman, and Shapiro (2001); and Zemsky et al (2005) propose a 
model that focuses on the pursuit of prestige, the expansion of administrative staff to 
support faculty in pursing prestige, and the increase in administrative costs.  These 
scholars (Massy & Zemsky, 1994; Massy & Zemsky, 1997; Policy Perspectives, 1990; 
Zemsky, Shaman, & Shapiro, 2001; Zemsky et al., 2005) developed a set of metaphors to 
describe their model of university behavior.  The “academic ratchet” represents faculty’s 
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pursuit of prestige through research and the resulting disengagement of faculty away 
from their home institution, while  “administrative lattice” represents the resulting 
increase in administrative staff and associated investments required to finance prestige 
(Policy Perspectives, 1990; Zemsky et al., 2005). 
In order to test their claims, Massy and Zemsky (1994; 1997) conducted two 
studies on faculty time to demonstrate the focus on prestige and the increasing reliance on 
administrative staff.  In one study, Massy and Zemsky (1994) examined faculty 
discretionary time in departments at four private colleges and two private universities.  
Using descriptive statistics and OLS, they show that faculty discretionary time is devoted 
more toward research toward classroom activities.  In a second study, Massy and Zemsky 
(1997) analyzed data from the same universities to test a utility model for teaching-load 
decisions.  Using two-stage least squares regression, Massy and Zemsky (1997) found 
that faculty are concerned with educational quality (i.e., keeping class size low) and 
minimizing course work load.  Because of the limited number of institutions in both of 
Massy and Zemsky’s (1994; 1997) studies, more research is required to understand the 
relationship between faculty time and prestige. 
In an extension of Massy and Zemsky’s (1994; 1997) studies, Melguizo and 
Strober (2007) implicitly used a utility-maximizing model to examine the relationship 
between faculty salaries and prestige.  In their model, Melguizo and Strober (2007) posit 
that faculty gain utility by enhancing the prestige of their respective institutions.  
Activities that enhance utility include being a principal investigator on a research grant, 
increasing the selectivity of the institution, publishing articles in refereed journals, 
publishing books, and receiving patents.  Using data from the National Study of 
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Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF), Melguizo and Strober (2007) tested whether reward 
systems at colleges and universities are aligned with the goal of enhancing prestige.  In a 
fixed effects regression model using survey data from 28,576 faculty, Melguizo and 
Strober’s (2007) findings suggest that salaries are higher for faculty who enhance 
institutional prestige.   
Cyrenne and Grant (2009) also used a utility model, based upon Garvin’s (1980) 
utility-maximizing framework in their study on university decision making and prestige 
at Canadian universities.  Cyrenne and Grant (2009) found that administrators at 
Canadian universities, much like their counterparts in the United States, seek to maximize 
prestige through selectivity and research productivity.  Using panel data from Maclean’s 
magazine rankings, Cyrenne and Grant (2009) used a panel data ordered probit-random 
effects model to test Garvin’s (1980) theory for Canadian institutions.  The results of 
their study revealed that faculty and administrators seek to maximize utility through 
selectivity and research productivity.  The findings, however, are only generalizable to 
Canadian higher education institutions.  The next section reviews the literature that 
addresses the prestige-maximizing behaviors of higher education from a market 
perspective where institutional behavior is proposed to be driven by market forces.  
 
Prestige and Market Models 
 Economists (Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2006; Hoxby, 1997; Winston, 1999) have 
noted that the pursuit of prestige in higher education is driven by market forces that are 
unique to nonprofit higher education institutions.  These scholars (Epple et al., 2006; 
Hoxby, 1997; Winston, 1999) adopted economic theories of the nonprofit market for 
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application to higher education institutions to illustrate how nonprofit colleges and 
universities increase prestige to compete in the higher education market.  This section 
discusses how the higher education market drives colleges and universities to maximize 
prestige. 
Hoxby (1997) describes one theory that drives college and university behavior in 
the higher education market.  Using concepts from market economics, Hoxby (1997) 
developed her own theory of college pricing for private four-year institutions, which 
describes what drives universities to pursue prestige.  Hoxby (1997) contends that the 
higher education market has shifted from a local market with a focus on local needs and 
consumer preferences to a national market that competes for high ability students.  She 
posits that the focus on prestige or student quality has increased because of competition 
on a national instead of regional scale.  National competition forced higher education 
institutions to either reduce tuition or increase marketing and financial aid expenditures to 
attract students.  Hoxby (1997) contends that as institutions increase selectivity, these 
institutions are perceived to be of higher quality and this higher quality allows colleges or 
universities to increase revenues through higher tuition.  Additionally, wealthy higher 
education institutions, with support from government, research grants, endowments, or 
voluntary support, can use their resources to attract high ability students.  She describes 
how the rich institutions become richer through a multiplier effect:  enrolling high ability 
students increases an institution’s desirability and demand, which increases academic 
quality, and subsequently increases revenue by attracting other high ability students 
willing to pay the increased tuition. 
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Hoxby (1997) used descriptive statistics, instrumental variable regression, and 
nine years of panel data from 1,221 colleges and universities to test the influence of 
prestige (as measured by student selectivity) on tuition prices.  She found that the market 
changed, from a localized market in 1940 to a national market in 1991.  She also found 
that higher SAT scores over time are related to higher tuition prices.  Although Hoxby’s 
(1997) study only describes the behavior of private colleges and universities, Geiger 
(2004) has conceptually applied the model to public four-year higher education 
institutions in the market as well.  No studies have tested Hoxby’s (1997) model on 
public universities. 
Winston (1999) also proposes a model where the market drives institutions to 
enhance prestige.  Using a “church and car dealership” metaphor that describes how 
colleges and universities operate, Winston (1999) contends that colleges and universities 
are part charity and part commercial enterprise (i.e., a firm).  Winston (1999) states that 
the higher education market is composed of “donative-commercial nonprofit” institutions 
where the customer is also an input for the product they produce:  an education.  Because 
the quality of the output depends on the quality of the institution’s input, competition 
exists for high ability or talented students.  Donative and commercial revenues enable 
institutions to compete for high ability and talented students by providing general 
subsidies in the form of attractive physical facilities to all students and financial aid to 
specific students.  Winston (1999) argues that, among donative-commercial nonprofit 
higher education institutions, the pursuit of high ability students creates a market 
environment that drives higher education institutions to further enhance prestige via 
increased student selectivity. 
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 Epple and his colleagues (2006) proposed another model of the market which, in 
part, examines the factors that predict quality at colleges and universities.  They used a 
general equilibrium model to examine the higher education market.  Equilibrium models 
are designed to identify what level of price and production yield an optimum level of 
demand.  Defining institutional quality by combining mean SAT score, expenditures per 
student, and the mean income of the student body, Epple et al. (2006) propose that 
colleges and universities seek to maximize institutional quality using financial aid and 
admissions processes.  Using OLS and instrumental variable regression in an equilibrium 
model of the higher education market, Epple and his colleagues (2006) examined 768 
private nonprofit colleges and universities to understand institutional quality and tuition 
pricing.  Epple et al. (2006) found that higher education institutions attempt to compete in 
the market to enhance quality by increasing expenditures and provide higher levels of 
financial aid in order to attract high ability students.  Similar to how Epple and his 
colleagues (2006) examined the inputs and outputs in their equilibrium model of the 
market, other scholars (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006; Volkwein 
& Sweitzer, 2006) made an effort to determine the inputs that yield higher levels of 
prestige.  The next section reviews the literature that discusses prestige within the context 
of input-output models. 
 
Prestige and Input-Output Models 
 Many researchers (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006; 
Volkwein and Sweitzer, 2006) utilize input-output models to understand which factors  
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impact desired organizational outputs, such as prestige.  This section discusses models of 
prestige and institutional outputs.     
In their input-output models, several scholars (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & 
Toutkoushian, 2006) identified a number of outputs that enhance an institution’s prestige.  
Dolan and Schmidt (1994) and Porter and Toutkoushian (2006) introduce a conceptual 
framework that theorizes that institutions of higher education attempt to maximize their 
outputs rather than their profits.  Such outputs include the number of alumni who earn 
doctoral/professional degrees, student quality, and faculty quality (Dolan & Schmidt, 
1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006), as well as faculty research productivity and 
reputation (Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006).  These scholars (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; 
Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006) found that prestige-related outcomes, such as research 
productivity and student quality, are simultaneously determined.  Using three-stage least 
squares regression, Porter and Toutkoushian (2006) found that an institution that can 
successfully maximize multiple outcomes will increase its reputation.  Maximizing 
outputs that are simultaneously determined can be especially challenging because one 
output can have a negative relationship with another output.  Porter and Toutkoushian 
(2006), for example, found that, although simultaneously determined, student quality was 
negatively correlated with research productivity.  Although useful in understanding 
prestige as an outcome, the framework presented in these studies is not applied to all 
types of higher education institutions.  Dolan and Schmidt (1994) did not include public 
institutions in their study while Porter and Toutkoushian (2006) excluded comprehensive 
higher education institutions and community colleges.     
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 Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) developed an input-process-output model 
combined with systems theory to explain factors that contribute to institutional prestige.  
Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) propose a conceptual model where institutional mission, 
control, governance, size, and wealth influence how an institution deploys its resources to 
enhance prestige.  Their model suggests that the availability of endowment and non-
tuition revenue enables institutions to invest in faculty research resources, student 
financial aid, and student services.  These investments serve to enhance an institution’s 
prestige.  Using two OLS block regression models and data from 242 national 
universities and 202 liberal arts colleges, Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) provided 
evidence that institutional characteristics such as age, size, and level of expenditures 
predict an institution’s prestige.  When faculty research productivity and student 
outcomes were entered into the model, the effect of these institutional characteristics was 
diminished.  Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) postulate that institutional characteristics and 
wealth are necessary, but not sufficient, for an institution to enhance prestige.  Consistent 
with Garvin’s (1980) model, Volkwein and Sweitzer’s (2006) model suggests that an 
institution requires wealth or multiple sources of revenue to enhance prestige, although 
wealth alone does not in itself predict prestige.  Volkwein and Sweitzer’s (2006) findings, 
however, are limited to describing public and private research universities and selective 
liberal arts institutions. 
Other scholars (Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & 
Ehrenberg, 1999b) attempted to understand how colleges and universities change 
administrative processes to increase prestige as measured by rankings publications.  
Without using a clear conceptual framework, these scholars (Meredith, 2004; Monks & 
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Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) used the U.S. News and World Report 
college and university rankings to measure quality at colleges and universities.  They 
(Meredith, 2004; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) proposed that 
higher education institutions attempt to change admissions and financial aid policies to 
increase student selectivity.  In a working paper using a linear regression model and 10 
years of panel data from 16 institutions, Monks and Ehrenberg (1999a) demonstrate that 
institutions increased financial aid to students to enhance the institutions’ selectivity as 
measured by admissions yield rates and standardized test scores (Monks & Ehrenberg, 
1999a).  Caution should be used with these results because Monks & Ehrenberg (1999a) 
did not adequately describe the statistical method or how they controlled for correlation 
across time periods.   
While Monks and Ehrenberg (1999a) focused only on private institutions in their 
research study, a study by Meredith (2004) found similar results using a broader sample 
of institutions.  Meredith (2004) attempted to understand the effects in changes in U.S. 
News rankings on admissions outcomes.  Using four fixed effects regression models (by 
sector) on data from 2,154 institutions, Meredith (2004) found that changes in rank were 
correlated with changes in admissions outcomes, such as the selectivity of an incoming 
class.  Results from Meredith’s (2004) study should be used with caution because 
endogeneity (i.e., variables that have their own predictors) was not accounted for in the 
model.  The next section describes how resource dependence theories are used to 
examine how public higher education institutions pursue prestige.   
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Prestige and Resource Dependence Theory 
 Some researchers (Grunig, 1997; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 
2006) used concepts from resource dependence theory to examine the pursuit of prestige 
among higher education institutions.  As described above in the review of alumni giving 
theories, resource dependence theorists approach the study of organizations by viewing 
organizations as coalitions that need to leverage power to obtain or maintain resources.  
The need to acquire resources creates dependencies between organizations and these 
dependencies constrain organizational choice (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In order to 
survive, organizations need to be responsive to the actions of competing organizations as 
a resource is consumed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In the higher education literature, 
scholars (Grunig, 1997; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006) propose 
that colleges and universities seek to increase prestige in order to acquire resources 
necessary for survival.  This section describes how concepts from resource dependence 
theory are used to examine the pursuit of prestige among higher education institutions. 
In applying resource dependence theory to higher education, Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1974) developed a model that presumes that prestige ensures that institution and 
department subunits gain access to resources.  Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) hypothesized 
that college or university subunits acquire power to the extent that they provide resources 
critical to the institution.  When resources are scarce within the college or university, this 
power ensures continued resources to the department.  Variables used to represent the 
concept of resources in the study include the number of students, national rank or prestige 
of the department, outside grants, public visibility, and administrative services.  Using 
multiple methods including descriptive statistics, OLS regression, and qualitative 
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methods to examine 17 departments at one university, Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found 
that departments that are able to secure national prestige for the institution are the 
departments with the most power to leverage resources.   In this study, prestige is seen as 
a way to obtain resources as well as a resource in itself.  More recent studies (Grunig, 
1997; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006) used resource dependence perspectives to examine 
resource acquisition across multiple institutions instead of at just one. 
Drawing from resource dependence theory, Grunig (1997) developed a conceptual 
model that is used to examine how reputation motivates university behavior.  Grunig 
(1997) contends that institutional characteristics, such as the level of doctoral enrollment, 
undergraduate enrollment, standardized tests scores, and research and development 
activities, influence an institution’s reputational rankings.  Grunig (1997) asserts that 
colleges and universities structure their activities in such a way as to make them valuable 
in the environments in which they exist.  An institution adjusts its size and selectivity in 
order to enhance its perceived service quality (through the reputational rankings) which 
allows the institution to acquire more resources (Grunig, 1997).  Grunig (1997) argues 
that when university administrators focus on increasing reputation through increased 
selectivity and research productivity, they do so for the survival of the institution at a 
time of reduced funding from external sources.   
In their study mentioned previously, Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) argue that 
institutional behaviors that enhance prestige are consistent with assumptions in resource 
dependence theory.  As stated above, Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) used an input-
process-output model to understand the factors that explain prestige.  Volkwein and 
Sweitzer (2006) argue that the findings of their study suggest that colleges and 
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universities interact with their environments to maximize the acquisition of human and 
financial resources.  They also argue that enhancing prestige through increasing student 
selectivity enables colleges and universities to more easily interact with their 
environments to attract additional resources.  Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) suggest that 
older, larger, and wealthier institutions have an advantage in maximizing prestige.  As a 
result, these institutions are more likely to successfully compete for financial and human 
resources.  The next section discusses literature that connects higher education costs with 
the pursuit of prestige and illustrates why wealthy institutions have an advantage in 
maximizing prestige. 
 
Prestige and Cost Models 
 Another theme in the higher education literature is the relationship between 
prestige and costs.  In his discussion of the economics of higher education, Winston 
(1999) observed that, compared to low-selectivity institutions, high-selectivity higher 
education institutions have higher costs.  Additionally, using descriptive statistics, he 
demonstrated that financial resources are not evenly distributed among higher education 
institutions (Winston, 1999).  This section discusses how cost-related theories have been 
used to examine prestige among higher education institutions. 
Archibald and Feldman (2008) contrasted two theories in order to explain 
increases in higher education costs.  Archibald and Feldman (2008) attempted to 
determine whether cost disease theory or revenue theory of cost was responsible for 
increased expenses in higher education.  Although they were interested in which theory 
explains costs in higher education, Archibald and Feldman (2008) also examined how 
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each theory views quality or prestige in relation to costs of providing higher education.  
Both theories are consistent with regard to explaining how most colleges and universities 
increase quality but differ in their explanations for how pursuing prestige impacts costs.   
Prestige in cost disease theory is not seen as a root cause of increased costs.  Cost 
disease theory, based on the work of Baumol and Bowen (1966), attributes increased 
costs to an industry’s ability to incorporate new technology to increase productivity.  
Baumol and Bowen (1966) assert that manufacturing industries are better positioned to 
increase productivity by incorporating technology than service industries are.  Lagging 
productivity growth in service industries relative to the manufacturing sector puts upward 
pressure on costs to attract highly skilled labor (Baumol, 1967; Baumol & Bowen, 1966).  
In higher education, prestige, from a cost disease theory perspective, is recognized but is 
not seen as the cause of increased costs.    Baumol (1967) asserts that even though in 
education, technology (e.g., teaching machines, closed circuit televisions) has been 
introduced into the classroom, class size must stay low in order to maintain quality.  
Colleges and universities, therefore, may choose not to maximize class size to increase 
the productivity of graduates because greater class size decreases prestige and education 
quality.  Additionally, Baumol (1967) states that quality becomes more expensive across 
institutions when productivity does not keep pace with the manufacturing sector.  From a 
cost disease theory perspective, colleges and universities seeking to enhance quality or 
prestige would expect costs to increase because it takes more investment to produce 
higher quality in higher education than it does in the more productive manufacturing 
sector. 
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In contrast to cost disease theory, revenue theory of cost attributes increased costs 
to access to additional revenues.  Developed by Howard Bowen (1980) to describe higher 
education, revenue theory of cost attributes increased costs in higher education to 
unrestricted increases in revenues.  As a result, higher education institutions will 
continuously spend all revenues they are given (Bowen, 1980).   
 
Prestige and Isomorphism 
 Some researchers (Dey et al., 1997; Milem et al., 2000; Morphew, 2002; 
Morphew & Baker, 2004; Morphew & Hartley, 2006) examine prestige in higher 
education using the sociological theory of institutional isomorphism.  DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) define isomorphism as a process by which firms or organizations emulate 
each other by adopting similar structures and policies.  When applied to higher education, 
isomorphism occurs when a college or university adopts structures, policies, and 
processes similar to other institutions in order to improve its prestige.  This section 
discusses prestige within the context of the literature on institutional isomorphism.   
Dey, Milem, and Berger (1997) and Milem, Berger, and Dey (2000) used 
institutional isomorphism as a framework in studies that examine faculty time allocation 
and publication productivity.  These scholars (Dey et al., 1997; Milem et al., 2000) argue 
that, over time, colleges and universities have begun to emulate each other by increasing 
research productivity in order to increase prestige.  In one study, Dey, Milem, and Berger 
(1997) used two faculty surveys to examine the production of research articles between 
two time periods at 99 institutions.  Using OLS regression, they found that faculty have 
increased their research production between the two time periods to emulate research 
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institutions (Dey et al., 1997).  In another study, using identical data and methods, Milem, 
Berger, and Dey (2000) found similar results when comparing faculty time allocation on 
research activities between the two time periods.  Dey and associates (1997) argue there 
is a hierarchy of institutions based on the level of research productivity.  Less prestigious 
colleges and universities at the bottom of the hierarchy are emulating institutions at the 
top of the hierarchy in order to increase their prestige.     
Using DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of isomorphism, Morphew and 
Baker (2004) examined the relationship between prestige maximization and 
administrative costs among higher education institutions.  Morphew and Baker (2004) 
tested the hypothesis that prestige causes administrative costs to increase as institutions 
changed designations from comprehensive institutions to doctoral extensive institutions.  
Using an OLS regression model and IPEDS data from 88 research universities over two 
time periods, they found that enhancing prestige at these institutions did not necessarily 
increase administrative costs.  Instead, Morphew and Baker (2004) found that institutions 
changed how they allocated expenditures to emulate the expenditure allocations of 
research institutions.  The lack of evidence of a relationship between prestige and 
administrative costs appears to contradict the results of research by Massy and Zemsky 
(1994; 1997) and Bowen (1980), who contend that the pursuit of prestige leads to 
increased costs.   
Institutional isomorphism seeks to explain why and how a higher education 
institution maximizes prestige.  Under this perspective, a higher education institution 
attempts to increase prestige by emulating the success of other institutions that are 
successful in gaining prestige.  This perspective parallels Garvin’s (1980) utility-
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maximizing model, which posits that faculty and administrators maximize utility by 
increasing research productivity and student ability, in part because other prestigious 
colleges and universities maximize utility through these same processes.    
 
Summary of Prestige Theories 
 This section discussed several theories of prestige in higher education.  Utility 
theories provide a framework to examine the behavior of administrators and faculty that 
seek to maximize utility by increasing prestige primarily through research productivity 
(Garvin, 1980).  Market theories provide perspectives that presume that higher education 
institutions enhance prestige to interact with and respond to the market (Epple et al., 
2006; Hoxby, 1997; Winston, 1999).  Input-output models contend that higher education 
firms are multi-product firms and outputs are simultaneously determined, with prestige 
being one component (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006).  Cost 
theories presume that prestige is expensive because the technology used to enhance 
prestige does not increase productivity in higher education as much as technology 
increases productivitiy in other sectors of the economy (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; 
Baumol, 1967).   The theory of isomorphism describes how higher education institutions 
emulate each other and consequently maximize utility via prestige (Dey et al., 1997; 
Milem et al., 2000; Morphew, 2002; Morphew & Baker, 2004; Morphew & Hartley, 
2006). 
A common theme across all these theories is that higher education institutions are 
required to make significant investments to enhance prestige.  The drive to invest in 
prestige coupled with declining state appropriations (Heller, 2006), requires higher 
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education institutions to seek funding from outside sources, such as alumni donations, to 
remain competitive.  These theories on prestige, however, have not been used to model 
alumni giving at public research universities.  The next section discusses the conceptual 
framework that is used in this study to examine the relationship between alumni giving 
and selectivity in public research universities. 
 
IV. Conceptual Framework 
 Grounded in the economic theory of nonprofit organizations and extended to 
higher education institutions, the conceptual framework developed for this study posits 
that prestige influences alumni giving at public research universities.  This economic 
conceptual framework addresses a major limitation in the alumni giving literature in that 
it addresses the need for institution-level analyses over time.  As shown in Figure 2.1, the 
conceptual framework comprises two components.  The first component includes 
concepts reflecting alumni giving at higher education institutions.  The second 
component includes concepts that reflect institutional prestige.  This section will present 
each of these interconnected components. 
 
Alumni Giving Component 
 Drawing from concepts in economics and the philanthropic giving literature in 
higher education, the first component of the conceptual framework is used to examine the 
predictors of alumni giving at public research institutions.  Prestige, the variable of 
interest for this study, is included in the model based upon Garvin’s (1980) utility-
maximizing model and connects this model with conceptual frameworks proposed by  
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Figure 2.1.  Conceptual framework:  A dynamic model of alumni giving 
 
 
several scholars (Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Leslie and Ramey, 1988; Rose- 
Ackerman, 1996), who hypothesize that prestige in nonprofit higher education 
institutions influence alumni giving.  Several scholars (Harrison, 1995; Monks, 2003; 
Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Weerts & Ronca, 2006) also suggest that alumni from 
prestigious and selective institutions give to colleges at higher rates or give more money.  
Therefore, prestige is included as a predictor in the alumni giving component of the 
conceptual framework. 
 The second predictor in the alumni giving component of the conceptual 
framework presumes that past levels of alumni giving influence future levels of giving.  















Smith, 2003; Harris, 1990; Harrison, 1995; Martin, 2005) posit that institutions with 
established development programs and the demonstrated ability to solicit donations are 
likely to have higher future levels of giving.  Winston (1999) and other scholars (Geiger, 
2004; Hoxby 1997) have observed that resources are unevenly distributed in higher 
education, so past success in soliciting donations should predict future success.  Another 
benefit of including lagged alumni giving in the model is the ability to test the second 
research question in this study.   
The third set of predictors of alumni giving includes institutional characteristics or 
controls that influence alumni giving.  Several scholars (Cabrera et al., 2005; Harrison, 
1995; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Monks, 2003; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Weerts & 
Ronca, 2006) have found that other variables can influence alumni giving.  Many 
scholars (Belfield & Beney, 2000; Blumenfeld & Sartain, 1976; Harrison, 1995, Monks, 
1999; Okunade, 1993; Okunade, 1996) have found that the presence of professional 
programs (law, medicine, and business) can impact alumni giving.  Smith and Ehrenberg 
(2003) and Leslie and Ramey (1988) show that an institution’s size can also influence the 
aggregate level of alumni giving to an institution.  Size, in terms of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) enrollment, is used to scale the finance variables to remove the effects of 
institutional size from the model.   
The three predictors in the alumni giving component of the conceptual framework 
are used to construct the first equation in a system of equations to model prestige’s 
influence on alumni giving.  Based on variables included in the conceptual model, this 
equation is summarized as follows: 
AGit = f (AGit-1, Pit, ICit)    (2.1), 
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where alumni giving (AGit) in a current period is a function of prestige (Pit) and 
institutional characteristics (ICit).   Alumni giving from the previous period (AGit-1) is 
included to examine the convergence/divergence of prestige on alumni giving over time, 
conditioned on the variables included in the model. 
 
Prestige Component 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the second component of the conceptual framework uses 
a modified version of Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing framework as a guide to model 
prestige at higher education institutions.  Because other scholars (Dolan & Schmidt, 
1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006) have shown that prestige is presumed to be an 
endogenous variable, a second component is included in the conceptual framework.  
Because much of the literature on prestige and alumni giving is congruent with Garvin’s 
(1980) utility-maximizing model, the conceptual model is modified to include concepts 
from the alumni giving literature.  
Although Garvin (1980) proposes two prestige variables in his model, the 
conceptual framework for this study includes prestige only in terms of student quality, as 
measured by the selectivity of an institution.  In this study, selectivity is used as a 
measure of prestige for several reasons.  First, Dolan and Schmidt (1994) and Porter and 
Toutkoushian (2006) developed a model where higher education outcomes, such as the 
selectivity of a class, and faculty research productivity are simultaneously determined.  
As a result, each prestige component should be modeled separately when examining 
alumni giving.  Second, because several scholars (Grunig, 1997; Pascarella et al., 2006; 
Webster, 2001) have noted that selectivity is highly correlated with U.S. News and World 
75 
Report  rankings, this study uses the selectivity definition as measured by standardized 
test scores.  Alumni have access to these ranking publications and may be more 
responsive to institutional performance based on selectivity rather than to performance 
based on faculty research productivity.  As a result, this study focuses on student 
selectivity as a measure of prestige. 
Garvin’s (1980) model suggests that colleges and universities are constrained by 
capital when maximizing prestige.  Garvin (1980) formulates his model to maximize the 
utility function with budgetary limitations reflected by the inclusion of finance variables.  
Because attracting talented faculty and students may increase costs, a college or 
university may need to raise funds by expanding enrollment, raising private gifts, or 
increasing research grants.  As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, institutional wealth and 
expenditures are hypothesized to influence prestige.  Several scholars (Geiger, 2004; 
Hoxby 1997; Winston, 1999) provide additional support for incorporating these two 
predictors, noting that institutions with the most wealth and highest expenditures are the 
ones with the highest level of prestige.  Geiger (2004) and Hoxby (1997), for example, 
state that institutions use endowment wealth and extra revenues to increase financial aid 
packages and marketing expenditures to attract talented students.  These expenditures, as 
a result, increase the institutions’ selectivity.  The following equation is used to represent 
the prestige component of the conceptual framework and takes into account the wealth 
and level of expenditures that research universities require to enhance prestige: 
Pit = f (Wit, Eit)     (2.2), 
where prestige (Pit ), as measured by student selectivity, is a function of an institution’s 
wealth (Wit), measured by the size of its endowment (Epple et al., 2006; Winston, 1999), 
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and its expenditures (Eit).  A system of equations representing the alumni component 
(equation 2.1) and the prestige component (equation 2.2) in the conceptual framework is 
used in this study to model prestige’s influence on alumni giving, given the predictors of 
prestige. 
 
V.  Summary 
This chapter presented a conceptual framework based on economic concepts that 
describe how nonprofit organizations strive to increase their prestige or status rather than 
to maximize revenues (Garvin, 1980; Newhouse, 1970).  The framework is developed by 
combining Garvin’s (1980) modified utility-maximizing model with concepts from 
models proposed by several scholars (Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Leslie & 
Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996), reflecting the economic perspective of donative 
giving applied specifically to alumni giving in higher education institutions.  The model 
departs from the traditional economic model of profit maximization to explain the 
behavior of nonprofit organizations and provides an alternative framework via the use of 
the concept of utility (Garvin, 1980; Lee, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Valentinov, 2006).  
Building on Garvin’s (1980) economic model of university behavior, this study utilizes a 
conceptual framework that includes student selectivity, rather than research productivity, 
as a measure of prestige.  Using the student selectivity definition, prestige is hypothesized 







Drawing on concepts from Garvin (1980) and other scholars (Cheslock & 
Gianneschi, 2008; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996), this study examines how an institution’s selectivity influences the amount of 
alumni giving among public research universities.  The conceptual framework for this 
study utilizes a modified version of Garvin’s (1980) economic model of university 
behavior and economic perspectives of alumni giving (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; 
Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) to examine 
this relationship.  The purpose of this study is to examine how selectivity influences 
alumni giving, while taking into account predictors of selectivity.  Specifically, this study 
will address the following research questions: 
1. After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent 
does an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
2. Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence 
or divergence among public research universities over time in alumni 
giving? 
This chapter describes the research design, data sources, statistical methods, variables, 




 In this study, the research design involves the use of panel data, also known as 
time series-cross sectional (TSCS) data covering 11 years from fiscal 1997 through fiscal 
2007.  The panel data are based on multiple surveys of colleges and universities that 
contain institutional information such as endowment income, expenditures, alumni 
giving, student selectivity, faculty research, and other related variables.   
 
Data Sources 
This study utilizes data drawn from three sources.  The first data source is the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), sponsored by the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  IPEDS is the U.S. Department of Education’s 
postsecondary education data collection program.  IPEDS data are compiled from eight 
surveys collected directly from providers of postsecondary education in the United States.  
The survey is a census of colleges and universities that receive Title IV federal aid.   
The surveys in IPEDS include the Institutional Characteristics, Completions, 12-
Month Enrollment, Human Resources, Fall Enrollment, Finance, Student Financial Aid, 
and Graduation Rate surveys.  The data collected in these surveys provide aggregate 
measures of an institution’s yearly financial, enrollment, graduation, and institutional 
characteristics.  This study draws data from the IPEDS Institutional Characteristics, 
Completions, Fall Enrollment, and Finance surveys.   The IPEDS Institutional 
Characteristics Survey provides general information about the institution including 
educational offerings, mission statements, admissions requirements, and student charges.  
This study utilizes educational offerings and admissions data from this survey.  The 
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Completions Survey captures data on the number of credentials awarded by an institution 
by academic program, gender, and race.  Data from the Fall Enrollment Survey include 
the number of students by award level, race, gender, and residence.  This study utilizes 
data on the number of undergraduate and graduate students attending the institution in the 
fall semester.  The Finance Survey describes the financial condition of each institution.  
Data elements from the finance data include financial aid, expenditures, revenues, and 
endowment data from audited financial statements (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2008).  This study utilizes expenditure and financial aid data.  Although each 
of these surveys is distinctly different, data collection is coordinated using the same 
collection process.   
NCES has collected data through IPEDS from colleges and universities since 
1986.  Prior to that, NCES conducted similar data collections under the Higher Education 
General Information Survey (HEGIS), the Survey of Non-Collegiate Postsecondary 
Institutions (SNPI), and the Vocational Education Data System (VEDS) (Jackson, 
Peecksen, Jang, Sukasih, & Knepper, 2005).  Institutions that receive Title IV funds 
under the Higher Education Act are required to submit data or risk the loss of funding.  
As a result, nearly all postsecondary institutions operating in the United States participate 
in the IPEDS surveys.  Depending on the year, NCES collects the Institutional 
Characteristics, Completions, and 12-Month Enrollment surveys in the fall; Human 
Resources, Fall Enrollment, and Finance surveys in the winter; and Student Financial Aid 
and Graduations Rate surveys in the spring.  In many states an IPEDS coordinator 
verifies that the surveys were correctly administered.  After the surveys are submitted to 
the National Center for Education Statistics, NCES staff checks the surveys and contacts 
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institutions if there are any errors.  NCES conducts regular technical quality studies of the 
data to ensure the surveys are standardized across institutions and the integrity of the data 
is maintained (Jackson et al., 2005).   
The second data source draws from an annual survey on voluntary support from 
the Council for Aid to Education (CAE).  Beginning in 1957, CAE has conducted the 
Voluntary Support of Education (VSE) survey every year in all sectors of education, from 
colleges and universities to secondary schools (Kaplan, 2001).  It provides standard 
measures across institutions for every year the survey has been offered.   The data 
collected in the VSE survey include information on all aspects of giving to education in 
the United States, including: 
• Gifts and grants to the institution, both for current operations and for 
capital purposes, regardless of form (cash, products, property, securities, 
etc.); 
• Gifts and grants to affiliated foundations and organizations created to raise 
funds for the institution; 
• Securities, real estate, equipment property, or other noncash gifts, 
evaluated at fair market value placed on them by an independent appraiser, 
not the cash income [from such properties]; 
• Deferred gifts; 
• Cash values of life insurance contracts; 
• Cash payments returned as contributions from salaried staff; and 
• Insurance premiums paid by donors (Kaplan, 2001 p. 44). 
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The data in VSE surveys are reported in a regular fiscal year (July 1 to June 30), although 
a minority of institutions use different dates to define their fiscal year.  The VSE survey 
does not track advertising revenue, contract revenues, contract research, contributions 
from government entities, earned income, transfers from affiliated foundations, or 
investment earnings (Kaplan, 2001).  Only aggregate alumni giving and endowment data 
from the VSE survey are used in this study. 
The data collection for the VSE survey begins on July 1 of a collection year.  The 
CAE sends email notices to nearly 3,000 colleges and universities with follow-up emails 
for those institutions with valid email address.  Additional educational institutions are 
eligible to participate.  In any given year, more than half of the four-year colleges in the 
United States participate in the survey.  For example, as shown in Table 3.1, nearly 50% 
of the four-year colleges and universities responded to the survey in 2001 (Kaplan, 2001,  




Voluntary Support of Education Survey response rates by type:  2001 
 Four-Year Colleges 
and Universities Two-Year Colleges 
All Higher 
Education 
Invited to Participate 1,858  1,115  2,973  
Responses 947  113  1,060  
Response Rate (%) 51  10  36  







Voluntary Support of Education Survey response rates of public four-year colleges and 





Participating Participation Rate (%) 
Research/Doctoral 161  133  81  
Masters 269  150  56  
Liberal Arts 73  18  25  
Specialized 45  20  44  
Total 548  321  59  




institutions, 56% of the public master’s institutions, and 25% of the public liberal arts 
institutions responded to the survey (Kaplan, 2001 p. 45).  Overall, 59% of public four-
year institutions responded to the survey, representing 53% of all public four-year higher 
education institutions in the United States.   
The third data source is the U. S. News and World Report’s yearly survey of 
colleges and universities.  U.S. News collects data from higher education institutions for 
the purposes of ranking colleges and universities for a yearly publication.  U.S. News 
surveys institutions on academic reputation, student selectivity, faculty resources, 
graduation and retention rates, financial resources, and alumni giving (Ehrenberg, 2002a).  
This study uses data on the 25th and 75th percentile SAT score of an entering class from 
each institution as a measure of student selectivity.  The standardized definitions for how 
to report SAT scores were developed collaboratively by magazine publishers, the College 
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Board, and national higher education associations, and have remained unchanged for the 
years of interest in this study.  Average standardized test score data from the U.S. News 
surveys are used for this study. 
 
Analytic Sample 
 The analytic sample for this study comprises public research universities drawn 
from NCES-sponsored IPEDS surveys.  Exactly 165 institutions were eligible for 
selection in this study.  The analytic sample comprises institutions that responded to all 
three data sources utilized for this study during a collection year.  After taking into 
account the available data from the IPEDS, VSE, and U.S. News surveys, the final size of 
the analytic sample is 147 public research universities across 11 years representing 89% 
of all public research universities.  The analysis includes 1,364 out of a possible 1,617 
institution/year observations, indicating that the dataset is unbalanced.  An analysis of the 
missing cases did not indicate there were differences between the analytical sample and 
the population of institutions. 
 
Variables 
 The dependent variable in this study is the amount of alumni giving per FTE 
student.  Alumni are defined as previous students who have earned credit toward a 
degree, regardless of whether they have earned a credential (Kaplan, 2001).  The 
independent variable of interest in this study is the selectivity of an institution, a proxy 
for one measure of prestige. 
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As discussed in the literature review, selectivity is included in the model based 
upon Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing model in conjunction with conceptual 
frameworks proposed by several scholars (Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Leslie & 
Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996), who hypothesize that prestige in nonprofit higher 
education institutions influences alumni giving.  Several scholars (Harrison, 1995; 
Monks, 2003; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Weerts & Ronca, 2006) also suggest that 
alumni from prestigious and selective institutions give to colleges at higher rates or give 
more money.   
Student selectivity is measured in the model using the midpoint between the 25th 
and 75th percentiles in standardized test scores of an admitted class.  Because several 
scholars (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999b) have used standardized test 
scores to measure selectivity, standardized test scores are used as a measure of prestige.  
Both SAT and ACT scores are used to measure selectivity.  ACT scores are converted to 
SAT scores using a conversion chart from the College Board based upon the national 
distribution of test scores on both examinations (Dorans, Lyu, Pommerich, & Houston, 
1997).  Although there are many definitions of prestige, standardized test scores are used 
because there is a high correlation between student selectivity and U.S. News ranking 
(Grunig, 1997; Pascarella et al., 2006; Webster, 2001) and it is plausible that alumni have 
access to this information and may be responsive to institutional performance based on 
selectivity. 
A number of control variables are also included in the model for this study.  Many 
scholars (Cabrera et al., 2005; Harrison, 1995; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Monks, 2003; 
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Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Weerts & Ronca, 2006) have found that other variables can 
influence alumni giving.  Only a few variables, however, can be used at the institutional 
level to predict alumni giving.  Prior research (Belfield & Beney, 2000; Blumenfeld & 
Sartain, 1976; Harrison, 1995, Monks, 2003; Okunade, 1993; Okunade, 1996) has 
demonstrated that professional programs (law, medicine, and business) can have 
predictive value in determining alumni giving levels.  Therefore, dummy variables 
indicating the presence of a program offering law (JD), business (MBA), or medical 
(MD) degrees are included in the model.  Because Smith and Ehrenberg (2003) and 
Leslie and Ramey (1988) show that an institution’s size can also influence the aggregate 
level of alumni giving to an institution, FTE enrollment is used to scale the finance 
variables that are included in the model. 
Because past levels of alumni giving influence future levels of giving, a lagged 
(by one year) alumni giving variable is included in the model.  Previous alumni giving is 
included in the model because several scholars (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Harris, 1990; 
Harrison, 1995; Martin, 2005) posit that institutions with established development 
programs and the demonstrated ability to solicit donations are likely to have high future 
levels of giving.  The relationship between past giving and future giving also explains 
why wealthy institutions can maintain their wealth relative to other institutions (Geiger, 
2004; Hoxby 1997; Winston, 1999).  Another benefit of including lagged alumni giving 
in the model is the ability to address the second research question in this study.  
In this study, selectivity is presumed to be an endogenous variable.  Some 
scholars (Dolan & Schmidt, 1994; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006) have indicated that 
prestige has its own predictors and may influence outcome variables.  A number of 
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researchers (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2006; Massy & 
Zemsky, 1997; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Winston, 1999; Zemsky, Shaman, & 
Shapiro, 2001) have introduced predictors of prestige that are independent of alumni 
giving.  Some scholars (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2006; 
Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Winston, 1999) suggest that institutional wealth allows 
colleges and universities to invest in prestige.  Other scholars (Massy & Zemsky, 1997; 
Winston, 1999; Zemsky, Shaman, & Shapiro, 2001) indicate that administrative 
expenditures will also influence prestige.  Predictors of prestige, therefore, include 
institutional wealth as measured by the end-of-year market value of an institution’s 
endowment per FTE student and total expenditures (excluding hospital expenditures) per 
FTE student.  Because data definitions of some finance variables changed between fiscal 
2002 and fiscal 2005 as a result of new accounting standards developed by the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), a dummy variable is included in the 
model to take into account possible differences in the calculation of total expenditures 
under the new GASB standards.   
Based upon the recommendations of Baltagi (2008), a time variable is included in 
the model to detrend the data and correct for trend stationary variables.  Trend stationary 
variables are non-stationary variables that are stationary within a time period (Baltagi, 
2008).  Because a review of the descriptive statistics and a priori statistical tests indicates 
that the finance and selectivity data are trending upward (or trend stationary) even after 
they are differenced from the previous time period, a time variable is included in the 
model to remove these effects.  Baltagi (2008) recommends that including a time variable 
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where a trend stationary variable is present will increase the efficiency of a statistical 
model. 
All continuous variables in this study are log transformed to ensure normal 
distributions.  Variables with zero values were assigned a value of one so they could be 
log transformed.  Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), all financial variables were 
transformed into 2006 dollars to adjust for inflation.  See Table 3.3 for a description of all 
the variables used in this study.   The descriptive statistics for the variables in this study 
are displayed in Table 3.4.      
 
Statistical Techniques 
In this study, dynamic fixed effects panel (DFEP) modeling techniques are used 
to examine the hypothesis that changes in an institution’s selectivity influence alumni 
giving.  This method is the most appropriate because it corrects for biased parameter 
estimates when using a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable with panel 
data.  Although panel data provide additional observations to increase the statistical 
power of an analysis, the presence of dynamic data (i.e., time lags) may result in spurious 
rather than actual relationships between variables when using OLS regression analysis 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Nickell, 
1981; Titus, 2009).  This section will describe how more appropriate statistical 
techniques are used to answer the research questions in this study.  This section also 
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Research Question 1:  Selectivity and Alumni Giving 
 
After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent does 
an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
 
The first research question in this study seeks to understand the extent to which 
student selectivity influences alumni giving at public research universities after taking 
into account predictors of selectivity.  A dynamic fixed effects panel (DFEP) model is an 
appropriate technique to address this question for several reasons.  First, compared to 
OLS or fixed effects regression, DFEP modeling allows researchers to model how past 
levels of alumni giving affect current levels of alumni giving more accurately (Arellano 
& Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).  Second, DFEP modeling can take into account 
institution-related fixed effects and time-related fixed effects.  In other words, DFEP 
modeling accounts for unobservable variables that are specific to each institution and 
year.  As a result, selectivity’s influence on alumni giving could be analyzed while taking 
into account unobserved variables that are of less interest.  Finally, DFEP models can 
take into account the possible endogeneity of regressors (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998) such as student selectivity.  Because it can simultaneously 
provide parameter estimates for a lagged dependent variable, account for unobserved 
effects, and allow for the endogeneity of an independent variable, DFEP modeling is the 
most appropriate technique to address the first research question in this study.   
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Although there are many benefits of using DFEP modeling to address the first 
research question, several scholars (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) 
have noted possible problems with DFEP modeling.  In earlier DFEP models, for 
example, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed using differenced variables or instruments 
in the model to correct for possible correlations between the independent variables and 
the error term.  Arellano (1989) found that the DFEP model that uses differenced 
instruments yielded parameter estimates with large standard errors for small sample sizes, 
which can result in spurious relationships between variables.  Other researchers (Arellano 
& Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) recommend using a DFEP model in 
combination with general method of moments (GMM) techniques for models with a 
lagged dependent variable and endogenous predictors.  Using GMM techniques yields 
more robust standard errors in the model and improves the accuracy of the parameter 
estimates (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).   
Although GMM techniques improve the accuracy of the DFEP model parameter 
estimates, Blundell and Bond (1998) advocate adding an additional set of instruments.  
According to Nickell (1981), using estimators in first-differenced models yields 
inconsistent results in samples with a small number of time periods and a large number of 
cases.  In these cases, causality between endogenous predictors and the dependent 
variable cannot be inferred since causality may be reversed.  To address these limitations, 
researchers (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) advocate using system 
GMM estimation.  The system GMM method corrects for the problems addressed by 
Arellano (1989) and reverse causality of endogenous variables by including a matrix of 
instrumental variables.  The system GMM method corrects for the problem of the reverse 
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causality of endogenous variables in the model by including past and future values of 
differences of strictly exogenous variables as instruments (Blundell & Bond, 1998).  In 
unbalanced panels (such as data in this study), forward orthogonal deviations or the 
average of all past and future observations are differenced in the system GMM method 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2006). 
To illustrate the benefits of using DFEP modeling, this study reports the results 
for an OLS regression model, a fixed effects regression model, and an instrumental 
variable regression model in addition to the system GMM dynamic fixed effects models.  
The next sections will illustrate how system GMM DFEP modeling is used for this study; 
briefly summarize OLS, fixed effects, and instrumental variable regression techniques 
and illustrate the limitations of these commonly used statistical techniques when using 
models with a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. 
 
Dynamic Fixed Effects Panel Models 
To illustrate the use of a dynamic fixed effects panel (DFEP) model for the 
influence of an institution’s selectivity on alumni giving, the conceptual framework for 
this study can be summarized using a system of equations.   In the first equation, alumni 
giving (AGit) in the current period is a function of alumni giving (AGit-1) in a previous 
period, prestige (Pit) (measured by student selectivity), and other institutional 
characteristics or controls (ICit).  Prestige is an endogenous variable predicted by wealth 
(Wit) and educational and general expenditures (Eit).  These relationships are represented 
by the following: 
AGit = f (AGit-1, Pit, ICit)    (3.1), 
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Pit, = f (Wit, Eit)      (3.2), 
where i denotes the institution and t denotes the time.  Combining the alumni giving and 
prestige equations (Equations 3.1 and 3.2 respectively) yields the reduced form of the 
dynamic equation: 
ittiitititit XWyy εληγγα +++++= − 211    (3.3), 
where yit is alumni giving per student; γ is the coefficient; Wit is the vector of endogenous 
variables including prestige and previous alumni giving; Xit is the vector of exogenous 
variables including control variables; ηi is an institution specific error term; λt is the time 
specific error term; and εit is the residual error.  Subtracting the value of each variable 
from the previous time period (i.e., first differences) of Equation 3.3 yields a model 
where researchers can account for unobserved variables: 
)()()()( 11211211 −−−−−− −++−+−+−=− itittitititititititit XXWWyyyy εελγγα  (3.4). 
The institution specific error term (ηi), which does not vary across time periods, is 
subtracted out of the model. 
Arellano (1989) found that the estimators in Equation 3.4 were inefficient and 
yielded large variances.  Additionally, Nickell (1981) showed that Equation 3.4 yields 
biased estimators where the direction of causality between endogenous predictors and the 
dependent variable cannot be inferred.  The following equation represents Equation 3.4 
rewritten to include the system GMM estimator: 
)()()( 112111 −−−− −++−+−++= itittitititititit XXWWyy εελγγβα   (3.5), 
where β is the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable.  Equation 3.5 represents the 
DFEP regression model with system GMM-style instruments.  With the corrections 
employed by system GMM, the model produces more robust standard errors, which will 
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provide a better understanding of the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).  The Hansen J test is used 
to ensure that the GMM-style instruments, as a group, are valid when included in the 
DFEP model.  Although some scholars have disputed that the Hansen J statistic 
accurately tests for the validity of instruments (see Wright, 2003), the statistic is the best 
method available at the time of this analysis. 
Stata (IC version 10.1), a statistical software package, is used to analyze the 
influence of selectivity on alumni giving by employing dynamic panel modeling via the 
Stata module, xtabond2.  In addition to appropriately addressing unobserved institution 
fixed effects, the presence of a lagged dependent variable that gives rise to auto 
correlation, and a panel dataset that has a relatively short time dimension, the use of the 
module xtabond2 allows analysts to take into account the endogenous nature of variables 
such as selectivity.  When using the Stata xtabond2 module, endogeneity is addressed in 
two stages.  In the first stage, selectivity is regressed on all the variables in the conceptual 
model.  In the second stage, alumni giving is regressed on the predicted values of 
selectivity along with other variables in the conceptual model.  However, the Stata 
xtabond2 module provides regression results from only the second stage.  Because of this 
limitation of the software, results from the first stage will be examined by reviewing p-
values for each of the parameter estimates in the first-stage of a static instrumental 
variable (2SLS) regression model.  Analyzing the first-stage should provide an indication 
of how consistent the model is with the conceptual framework.   
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed in the analysis for this study 
to demonstrate the challenges of analyzing an autoregressive dynamic panel model with 
OLS regression.  In order for OLS regression to yield accurate parameter estimates with 
corresponding standard errors, a number of assumptions must be met for a properly 
specified model.  Three basic assumptions of the OLS model include:  (1) the errors 
associated with one observation of the dependent variable are not correlated with errors 
associated with another observation, (2) the variance of the errors is the same at all levels 
of the independent variable (i.e., a state of homoskedasticity), and (3) the errors of the 
independent variable are not correlated with the dependent variable (Pedhazur, 1997).  
Violations of these assumptions can yield spurious relationships between variables.  The 
use of OLS regression with the conceptual framework in this study violates at least two 
of these assumptions. 
 In a simplified autoregressive model (Equation 3.6, below), the dependent 
variable (yit) has a group of predictors, plus an associated error term (εit).  The lagged 
dependent variable in the model (yit-1) should have similar predictors as the dependent 
variable, so the error term associated with yit-1 is going to be correlated with εit violating 
the first assumption. 
itititit xyy εγα ++= − 11     (3.6) 
Under the same logic, the error associated with yit-1 is going to be correlated with the 
dependent variable.  Additionally, when the lagged dependent variable is added to the 
model, it will account for the majority of the variance and yield a significant hypothesis 
test just because of its high correlation to the dependent variable and not because of any 
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substantive relationship.  A fixed effects regression model can address some of the 
limitations of the OLS regression model. 
 
Fixed Effects Regression 
 Another problem Roodman (2006) illustrates with OLS regression is that the 
fixed effects are not accounted for in the model.  If, for example, there was an unusual 
event affecting the finance variables in one year of the panel, the variance associated with 
that event is applied to the error term for the entire panel decreasing the accuracy of the 
coefficient estimates.  Similarly, if an unobserved institutional characteristic is not 
specified in the model, the error associated with that characteristic is again applied to the 
error term for all institutions.  Fixed effects regression is designed to account for these 
unobserved independent variables and improve the accuracy of the model.   
 Of the many methods used to calculate the fixed effects estimator, one method 
that easily demonstrates how the model accounts for unobserved variables is the least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) method.  The LSDV method of modeling fixed effects 
applies dummy variables to the OLS regression model for each institution or time period 
(Roodman, 2006).  Each dummy variable accounts for the variance of the fixed effects 
within each institution and time period.  Other methods to calculate the fixed effects yield 
identical results but do not overtly use dummy variables. 
 Although fixed effects regression accounts for unobserved variables, Nickell 
(1981) and Roodman (2006) purport that the fixed effects model does not correct for 
dynamic panel bias.  Roodman (2006) contends that the fixed effects model overcorrects 
for the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model.  Whereas the OLS model 
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biased the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable upward (yielding potentially 
unreliable statistically significant coefficients), the fixed effects model biases the 
coefficient downward (yielding potentially incorrect statistically insignificant 
coefficients).  The true estimate, therefore, should be between these two coefficients.  
Hence, an alternative statistical technique is required to correct for dynamic panel bias in 
the model. 
 
Instrumental Variable Regression (Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)) 
 Instrumental variable regression, commonly known as two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression corrects for inaccurate coefficient estimates due to endogenous 
variables in the dynamic panel model.  Verbeck (2004) describes 2SLS regression as a 
simultaneous equation system to correct for the presence of endogenous variables 
through a two-step process.  In the first step, endogenous variables are regressed on 
exogenous variables using OLS regression analysis.  In the second step, the endogenous 
variables are replaced with their predicted values from the first step, and then a final 
model is estimated using OLS regression.  Additionally, this method can account for 
fixed effects as described above, as well as for a lagged dependent variable as a predictor 
in the model under the presumption that it is endogenous. 
 Roodman (2006) observes that 2SLS regression can still yield inefficient 
parameter estimates.  2SLS regression is very efficient under conditions of 
homoskedasticity (i.e., variability across the regression line is constant) but performs very 
poorly under conditions of heteroskedasticity (i.e. variability across the regression line is 
not constant) (Roodman, 2006).  Under conditions of heteroskedasticity in dynamic panel 
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data, DFEP modeling is the most robust technique to address the first research question 
(Roodman, 2006). 
  
Research Question 2:  Convergence and Divergence of Alumni Giving Rates 
 
Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence 
or divergence among public research universities over time in alumni 
giving? 
 
 The second research question in this study seeks to understand if there is evidence 
of convergence or divergence over time in alumni giving at public research universities 
after taking into account the predictors of alumni giving and prestige.  This research 
question is addressed by examining the sign of the coefficient for the lagged alumni 
giving variable (β in equation 3.5).  A positive sign of the lagged dependent variable 
would indicate convergence and a negative sign would indicate divergence in alumni 
giving among public research universities over time. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study has at least three limitations.  First, data that are used in this research 
are based on secondary sources.  This study is dependent on the methodology and data 
definitions used by other researchers and findings can only be interpreted given these 
definitions.  For example, the definition of alumni in the Voluntary Support of Education 
Survey includes previous students that did not graduate.  Second, this study only models 
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public research universities.  The potential findings from this study should not be used to 
describe other sectors or institution types.  Third, this study uses a rational perspective 
from the field of economics to understand the conceptual framework proposed in this 
study.  Other scholars (Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1986; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972; James, 1990) note that higher education institutions are highly ambiguous and 
complex.  In future studies, other perspectives and frameworks that can account for this 
complexity should be used to examine the influence of selectivity or prestige on alumni 
giving to higher education institutions.     
 
Summary 
 Drawing on concepts from Garvin (1980) and other economists (Cunningham and 
Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Leslie and Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) this chapter 
presented a model for understanding the relationship between an institution’s selectivity 
and alumni giving.  This chapter described a dynamic fixed effects panel (DFEP) model 
via system generalized method of moments (GMM).  System GMM DFEP modeling is 
recommended by a number of scholars (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 
1998) as the most appropriate method to address the research questions in this study 
because it corrects for endogeneity, unobserved variables, heteroskedasticity, and 
dynamic panel bias.  This study will demonstrate the use of modeling dynamic panel data 
by comparing the results of system GMM DFEP models with OLS regression, fixed 






 This chapter presents the results of the study within the context of the two 
research questions.  Before presenting the results to address each research question, a 
priori statistical analyses are presented to better understand the characteristics of the data.  
Given the conceptual framework and the characteristics of the data, the a priori analyses 
demonstrate which statistical technique is most appropriate to address the research 
questions.  Given this information, a DFEP model is the technique with the least number 
of limitations.   
 The first research question for this study seeks to understand the extent to which 
an institution’s selectivity influences alumni giving at public research universities, after 
taking into account the predictors of selectivity.  Before addressing the research question, 
this chapter compares the results of OLS, fixed effects, and instrumental variable 
regression models to demonstrate how DFEP modeling addresses the limitations 
presented in each model.  The results of two DFEP models using difference and system 
GMM are compared to each other and interpreted to answer the first research question.   
The second research question seeks to address if there is evidence of convergence 
or divergence in alumni giving.  Using the results presented in the DFEP model described 
above, this section demonstrates how to interpret the model to understand if convergence 
or divergence is occurring in alumni giving.   
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A Priori Statistical Analyses 
 To ensure all the assumptions are met for the statistical models in this study, a 
priori statistical analyses are conducted to understand the structure and characteristics of 
the dataset.  One set of tests seeks to understand how much observations in a time period 
depart from the mean in the entire sample (known as non-stationary data characteristics 
or a unit root).  In order to uncover non-stationary characteristics of the data in this study 
two statistical tests are employed.  In addition to testing non-stationary characteristics, a 
statistical test is employed to examine if heteroskedasticity of variance is present in the 
dependent variable.  Heteroskedasticity describes a characteristic of data where the 
variability of the data changes along a regression line and can yield inconsistent results in 
OLS regression.  A final test is used to determine the endogenous properties of variables.  
This section presents the results of these analyses and describes which method can yield 
the most robust results given these limitations in the data. 
 The first set of statistical tests used for this analysis seeks to understand if the 
dependent variable is stationary around a time trend.  When testing unit roots in panel 
data with some institutions missing years of data (an unbalanced panel), Maddala and Wu 
(1999) propose using Fisher’s test to compare unit root tests for each institution time-
series.  The null hypothesis is a non-stationary time-series for all higher education 
institutions.  The alternative hypothesis is that at least one institution displays a stationary 
time series.  As shown in Appendix B (see pages 136-140), the test rejects the null 
hypothesis indicating that at least one institution’s data are stationary.  Despite these 
results, non-stationary data may still be in the dataset, as the presence of just one 
institution with stationary data can yield a statistically significant result.  A second unit 
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root test is conducted to understand the prevalence of non-stationary data in the panel 
dataset.   
 Using a subsample of 78 institutions with a complete panel of 11 years of data, a 
second unit-root test, using the Hadri (2000) technique, is conducted.  The null 
hypothesis for this test, in contrast to Fisher’s test, is a stationary trend, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis is non-stationary.  As demonstrated in Appendix B, most of these 
unit-root tests reject the null hypothesis, providing evidence of non-stationary data in the 
panels.  Given these results, it is presumed that the data are non-stationary and a 
statistical test robust to these characteristics is necessary. 
  The second statistical test examines heteroskedasticity of variance in the 
dependent variable.  To test for changes in variance across institutions, the coefficient 
estimates of a generalized least squares regression model applied to panel data under 
assumptions of homoskedasticity were compared with the same model accounting for 
heteroskedasticity.  A likelihood ratio test compares the coefficients between the two 
generalized least squares models to see if accounting for heteroskedasticity yields 
statistically difference coefficients.   The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
coefficient estimates are the same for both models.  The alternative hypothesis is that the 
coefficient estimates are different, indicating that a statistical technique must account for 
heteroskedasticity.  As demonstrated in Appendix C (see pages 141-142), it is probable 
that heteroskedasticity exists in the dependent variable. 
 The third statistical analysis seeks to verify the assumption that SAT score is an 




First stage results of a static instrumental variable/generalized method of moments fixed 
effects regression model:  estimated coefficients and standard errors of the endogenous 
variable SAT score:  1997-2007 




Professional Degree Programs  
     Law (JD) -0.012 
(0.001) 
     Business (MBA) 0.001 
(0.001) 
     Medicine (MD) 0.000 
(0.002) 
Endowment value 0.004 
(0.002) 
* 
Expenditures, lagged 1 year 0.269 
(0.012) 
* 





Number of Institutions 141 
Number of Instruments 15 
Year Dummies? Yes 
  
F-Statistic 2.58 ** 
R-Squared 0.181 ** 
  
Hansen J Statistic 0.896 
  
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
All continuous variables in this study are log transformed to ensure 
normal distributions.  Variables with zero values were changed to 
one so they can be log transformed.  All financial variables were 
transformed into 2006 dollars to adjust for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The partial R-squared of excluded 
instruments is .0164 and is statistically significant (p < .01). 
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stage estimation generated by a static instrumental variable regression model (i.e. a 
lagged dependent variables is not in the model as an independent variable).  In order to 
account for endogenous regressors, instrumental variable regression first regresses 
endogenous variables on exogenous regressors, and then uses the predicted values of the 
endogenous variables in the second-stage.  The results from the first stage provide an 
indication of whether variables that are presumed to be endogenous in the model are 
endogenous.  The first stage of the static model is statistically significant, with an R-
squared statistic accounting for 18% of the variability in SAT score [F(15,140) = 2.59; R-
squared = .182; p < .01}].  Two variables in the first stage are statistically significant 
predictors of the endogenous SAT score variable:  endowment value per FTE (beta = 
.0004; p < .05) and lagged expenditures per FTE (beta = .269; p < .05).  Table 4.1 also 
shows that the Hansen J statistic is non-significant (p < .34), indicating that the 
instrumental variables, as a group, are not correlated with the error term.  Although 
statistically significant, the instruments do not account for a large amount of variability.  
The partial R-squared of excluded instruments for SAT score is only .0164, but is 
statistically significant (p < .01).  In other words, only 1.6% of the variance of SAT is 
reduced by including endowment value and expenditures.  Although the partial R-squared 
value is low, the beta values, the overall R-squared statistic, and the Hansen J statistic 
suggest that SAT score is endogenous and should be instrumented in the dynamic 
statistical model.  
 The statistical tests for this a priori analysis show that non-stationary data, 
heteroskedasticity of variance, and endogenous variables may complicate the modeling 
required to answer the research questions.  Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2000) note that first-
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differencing variables will transform a non-stationary trend to a stationary trend.  A 
DFEP model using difference generalized method of moments (difference GMM) 
accounts for non-stationary data and heteroskedasticity by utilizing a regression model on 
first-differences.  A system GMM captures the adjustment employed in difference GMM 
in a system of matrixes to correct for the presence of endogenous variables and large 
variances as described by Arellano (1989).   
    
Results by Research Question 
 This chapter presents the findings for each of the two research questions.  The 
results are displayed by each question and summarized at the end of the chapter. 
 
Research Question 1:  Prestige and Alumni Giving 
 
After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent does 
an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
 
The first research question in this study seeks to understand the extent to which 
changes in an institution’s selectivity result in changes in alumni giving at public research 
universities after taking into account the predictors of selectivity.  In order to demonstrate 
the method used for this analysis and to understand how inappropriate statistical methods 
may be misinterpreted in the literature, this chapter presents five statistical models of 
increasing sophistication, each addressing the limitations of the previous method.  The 
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statistical regression models used to understand the influence of an institution’s 
selectivity on alumni giving include OLS regression, fixed effects regression, 
instrumental variable (two-stage least squares (2SLS)) regression, and two DFEP models 
using generalized method of moments (GMM).  See Appendix D for detailed information 
on the Stata commands used to estimate these models. 
Table 4.2 displays the results from the first two models.  Model 1 uses OLS 
regression to understand how the SAT midpoint score influences alumni giving over 
time.   The first model tests whether the SAT score influences alumni giving per FTE 
student, taking into account the presence of professional degree programs, endowment 
value per FTE, and expenditures per FTE.  At first glance, Model 1 appears consistent 
with the hypothesis that SAT score influences alumni giving yielding a statistically 
significant model [F(17, 1,015)=104.03; r2=.562].  SAT score (beta=1.40; p < .001), 
endowment value (beta=.650; p < .001), and expenditures (beta=.395; p < .001) are all 
significant positive contributors to alumni giving per FTE student.  Having a medical 
degree program is a negative contributor to alumni giving (beta= −.177; p < .001). 
In Model 2, the lagged dependent variable is added to the model as an independent 
variable to create what is called an autoregressive model.  The lagged alumni giving 
variable accounts for the majority of the variance in the model (beta=.719; p < .001).  The 
R-squared increases from .56 to .80 and SAT score, the presence of the law professional 
degree program, and expenditures are no longer significant predictors of alumni giving.  
The number of observations drops from 1,364 to 1,177 because one less year of data is 




The influence of selectivity on alumni giving:  OLS, autoregressive OLS, and fixed 
effects regression models estimated coefficients and standard errors:  1997-2007 
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Observations 1,364 1,177 1,177 
Number of Institutions 145 145 145 
Year Dummy Variables? Yes Yes Yes 
    
F-Statistic 104.03 *** 270.69 *** 3.78 *** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.562 0.796 0.410 
    
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in parentheses. 
All continuous variables in this study are log transformed to ensure normal distributions.  
Variables with zero values were changed to one so they can be log transformed.  All 
financial variables were transformed into 2006 dollars to adjust for inflation using the 





According to Roodman (2006), the OLS model is prone to Type II error because 
of an upward bias in the parameter estimate of the dynamic variable (lagged alumni 
giving) or large standard errors.  One approach to address this error is to purge out fixed 
effects.  Roodman (2006) states that the lagged dependent variable term is endogenous to 
fixed effects (or unobserved variables) in the error term of the OLS model.  Fixed effects 
regression accounts for unobserved independent variables but over-corrects the OLS 
model and provides downwardly biased parameter estimates (Roodman, 2006).   
The results from the fixed effects regression model are displayed in Model 3.  In 
this model, not as many predictors are statistically significant contributors to alumni 
giving when compared to the OLS autoregressive model.  Only endowment value per 
FTE student (beta=.137; p < .05) and expenditures per FTE student (beta=.475; p < .05) 
are predictors of alumni giving.  When comparing the OLS autoregressive model with the 
fixed effects model, Roodman (2006) states that the parameter estimate for the lagged 
dependent variable lies between the OLS regression model (Model 2) and the fixed 
effects model (Model 3).  Therefore, it should be expected that the lagged alumni giving 
variable should have a beta that ranges between 0.017 (from the OLS regression model) 
and 0.719 (from the fixed effects regression model).  
Table 4.3 displays the results of the regression models that address the limitations 
of the statistical model presented above.  Model 4 presents the results of an instrumental 
variable regression model.  Instrumental variable regression, more commonly known as 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, is more appropriate than the previous methods 
because it can account for endogenous regressors as well as fixed effects.  The method 
uses a two-stage process to calculate parameter estimates.  In the first stage, using OLS 
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Table 4.3 
The influence of selectivity on alumni giving:  Instrumental variable and dynamic fixed 
effects panel models estimated coefficients and standard errors:  1997-2007 
 Model 4:  
Instrumental 
Variable (2SLS) 
Model 5:  
Difference 
GMM 
Model 6:  
System 
GMM 
    
Constant   1.837 
(3.742) 
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Observations 1,173 1,032 1,177 
Number of Institutions 141 141 145 
Number of Instruments 14 22 33 
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
    
F-Statistic 3.53 *** 3.86 *** 43.05 *** 
    
Hansen J Statistic 7.541 * 10.49  10.69 
Arellano-Bond tests for     
    AR(1) in first differences (Z)  -3.44 *** -3.69 *** 
    AR(2) in first differences (Z)  0.54 0.06 
    
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in parentheses 
Only second-stage results of the instrumental variable model are displayed.  First stage 
results are available in Appendix D, page 146.  All continuous variables in this study are 
log transformed and variables with zero values were changed to one so they can be log 
transformed.  All financial variables were transformed into 2006 dollars.   
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regression, endogenous variables are regressed against exogenous regressors.  In the 
second stage, the endogenous variables are replaced with their predicted values from the 
first stage, and then a final model is estimated using OLS regression (Verbeck, 2004).  As 
shown in Model 4, SAT score is once again a statistically significant predictor of alumni 
giving per FTE (beta=19.78; p < .05).  Although the model accounts for fixed effects and 
endogenous variables, it is still subject to dynamic panel bias.  According to a number of 
scholars (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; 
Nickell, 1981; Titus, 2009), all the models presented thus far can yield spurious 
relationships due to the correlation problems related to a lagged dependent variable in the 
model.  The only way to address this bias is through the transformations in DFEP 
modeling techniques (Roodman, 2006).   
In this analysis, a DFEP via GMM is used to address the research question 
regarding the influence of an institution’s selectivity on alumni giving.  This method is 
the most appropriate because it corrects for biased parameter estimates when using a 
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable with panel data.  Model 5 in Table 
4.3 presents the results of the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator (difference GMM).  
Difference GMM accounts for the fixed effects by first-differencing all the variables in 
the model using data from the previous time period.  For unbalanced panels (i.e., data 
with missing cases in certain years), a similar transformation of the variables is used 
instead of first differencing.  Given that some observations may be missing, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) propose subtracting the average of all lags and leads of the variable rather 
than subtracting first differences, which may be missing for some institutions.  Using this 
alternate transformation method, Model 5 yields no statistically significant predictors of 
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alumni giving per FTE but does produce a statistically significant model [F (17, 141) 
=3.85, p < .001].  SAT midpoint score is no longer a predictor of alumni giving per FTE 
(beta=-2.06; p < .15); endowment value per FTE (beta=.097; p < .10) and expenditures 
per FTE (beta=.572; p < .35) also have no statistical significance.   
Two diagnostic statistics are used to determine if a dynamic panel model using 
GMM is properly specified.  The Hansen J statistic is designed to test whether all the 
variables (as a group) in the model are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error 
term).  The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables included in the model are 
exogenous and uncorrelated with the error.  The alternative hypothesis indicates that the 
instruments are correlated with the error term and cast doubt on the validity of the 
instruments.  Although the Hansen J statistic is not significant at the .05 level, the 
probability that another sample will yield invalid instruments is still high (χ2=10.49; p < 
.10). 
The second diagnostic statistic tests for autocorrelation of the lagged dependent 
variable and other endogenous variables.  Autocorrelation indicates that the lags of the 
dependent variable (or other endogenous variables) are not exogenous.  The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the variables are exogenous and autocorrelation is not 
present.  The alternative hypothesis indicates that autocorrelation is present and the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors may not be accurate.  Two sets of statistics are 
presented in Table 4.2.  The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in first-differenced 
residuals (AR1) is expected to be statistically significant.  If the test is not significant, 
then DFEP modeling is not required to model the data.  The Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation in the final GMM model (AR2) is not expected to be statistically 
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significant in a properly specified model, indicating that the variable transformations 
successfully corrected for autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006).  In 
the difference GMM DFEP model presented in Table 4.4, the Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation yielded a statistically significant test for first-order autocorrelation (AR1) 
(Z=−3.44; p < .001) and no statistical significance in second-order autocorrelation (AR2) 
(Z=.54; p < .60), indicating that the final model was free of autocorrelation. 
Although the difference GMM model is an improvement on instrumental variable 
regression, Blundell and Bond (1998)  have shown that it still produces weak instruments 
leading to spurious relationships among the variables.  In order to provide more accurate 
parameter estimates, additional corrections to the model are required through system 
GMM.  The final model on Table 4.3 shows more precise estimates of the standard error. 
Model 6 presents the results from the DFEP using the Blundell-Bond (1998) 
system GMM estimator.  The system GMM method corrects for the problems addressed 
by Arellano (1989) and reverse causality of endogenous variables by including a matrix 
of instrumental variables.  The method incorporates the corrections from the first-
difference GMM estimator into a system of these additional instrumental variables.  
Roodman (2006) recommends using an additional modification to the model through the 
Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for variance to adjust for a downward bias in 
the standard errors, which is endemic to other GMM models.  With the corrections 
employed by system GMM, the model produces more robust standard errors which 
provides a better understanding of the relationships among variables (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).   
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 As shown is Table 4.3, Model 6 provides a robust model that predicts alumni 
giving per FTE with a statistically significant model [F(17, 144) = 43.05; p < .001].  
Although the model as a whole is statistically significant, SAT score does not predict 
alumni giving per FTE student (beta = -1.05; p < .50).  Endowment per FTE student is a 
significant positive predictor (beta = .64; p < .001) as is the presence of a law program 
(beta = .116; p < .05).  The presence of a medical program is a significant negative 
predictor of alumni giving (beta = −.22; p < .001).  The diagnostic statistics for this 
model indicates that the model is appropriately specified with a Hansen J statistic, 
showing no statistical significance (χ2=10.69; p < .80), and the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation (AR2) also showing non-statistical significance (Z = .06; p < .95).  As 
shown in Model 6, SAT score is not a predictor of alumni giving after taking into account 
other variables and fixed effects reflecting unobservable variables.   
 
Research Question 2:  Convergence and Divergence of Alumni Giving Rates 
 
Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence or 
divergence among public research universities over time in alumni giving? 
 
 The second research question for this study seeks to understand if there is 
evidence of convergence or divergence over time in alumni giving at public research 
universities after taking into account the predictors of alumni giving and selectivity.  This 
research question is addressed by examining the sign of the estimated coefficient for the 
lagged alumni giving variable.  A positive sign of the lagged independent variable 
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(alumni giving) would indicate that alumni giving rates are moving toward the average 
(converging), whereas a negative sign would indicate that giving rates are moving away 
from the average (diverging).  As shown in Model 6 in Table 4.3, lagged alumni giving 
was not statistically significant (beta = .12; p < .15), with a beta near zero.  Therefore, 
there is no evidence of convergence or divergence in alumni giving rates. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter provided the results of the findings for the two research questions in 
this study.  The first research question for this study seeks to understand the extent to 
which an institution’s selectivity influences alumni giving at public research universities 
after taking into account the predictors of selectivity.  This chapter addresses the first 
research question by presenting the results of OLS, fixed effects, instrumental variable, 
and DFEP regression models.  Blundell and Bond (1998) note that a DFEP using system 
GMM provides the most accurate coefficient estimates used to answer the first research 
question.  The findings suggest that changes in an institution’s SAT midpoint score have 
no explanatory value for predicting alumni giving per FTE student.  The second research 
question for this study seeks to understand if there is evidence of convergence or 
divergence over time in the rate of change in alumni giving at public research 
universities, after taking into account the predictors of alumni giving and selectivity.  
This research question is addressed by examining the sign of the coefficient for the 
lagged alumni giving variable in the system GMM DFEP model.  An examination of the 
coefficient estimate indicates that there is no evidence of convergence or divergence in 






 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of the findings in this 
study as it relates to the alumni giving literature.  First, this chapter compares and 
contrasts the results from the study with the alumni giving literature and describes why 
the results of this analysis differ from other studies.  Next, this chapter discusses the 
implications of this study for future research and practice.  Finally, the chapter concludes 
by providing recommendations for future research.    
 
Discussion of the Findings 
As stated in chapter 2, the conceptual framework for this study describes how 
nonprofit organizations, such as research universities, strive to increase their prestige or 
status rather than maximize profits (Garvin, 1980; Newhouse, 1970).  The conceptual 
framework posits that alumni gain utility through their donations as a result of the 
increase in the prestige of their institutions (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Ehrenberg & 
Smith, 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  The conceptual framework 
further proposes that selectivity, the measure of prestige in this study, has its own 
predictors (endowment values and expenditures).  Lagged alumni giving and the presence 
of professional degree programs are also posited to influence alumni giving.  As 
demonstrated by the next section, the conceptual framework, as developed through a 
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review of the economics literature, is inconsistent with the findings in this study.  
Alternative theories are proposed to explain these inconsistencies. 
 This section discusses the findings of this study by research question.  The first 
research question focuses on the influence of selectivity and alumni giving.  The findings 
on the relationship between selectivity and alumni giving, as well as the control variables 
such as professional degree programs and institutional wealth (endowment per FTE 
student), are discussed and compared with the literature on alumni giving.  The answer to 
the second research question, which focuses on the extent to which there is a divergence 
or convergence in alumni giving among public research institutions, is also compared 
with the literature on alumni giving.  This section concludes by discussing the 
contributions of the findings to the philanthropic literature. 
 
Research Question 1:  Selectivity and Alumni Giving 
 
After taking into account predictors of student selectivity, to what extent does 
an institution’s selectivity influence alumni giving at public research 
universities? 
 
 As shown in chapter 4, the results indicate that many of the control variables are 
associated with alumni giving.  The presence of a law program is positively related to 
alumni giving, while the presence of a medical program is negatively associated with 
alumni giving.  An institution’s endowment value (or wealth) is positively related to 
alumni giving.  SAT score, the presence of a business program, and an institution’s 
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annual expenditures have no statistically significant relationship with alumni giving.  
This section will describe how and why the results of this study differ from the findings 
in the literature on alumni giving.   
 
Professional Degree Programs 
This study included three professional degree programs in the model as control 
variables.  Two of the three variables were statistically significant and associated with 
alumni giving.  The presence of a law program had a statistically significant positive 
relationship with alumni giving.  This is consistent with Monks’ (2003) study on alumni 
giving, which purports that graduate giving from law programs is associated with higher 
alumni giving.  Inconsistent with Monks’ (2003) study is the finding that the presence of 
an MBA program has no statistically significant effect.  Monks (2003) did provide some 
evidence, however, that the presence of a medical program has a statistically significant 
negative relationship with alumni giving, which is consistent with the findings in this 
dissertation.  Belfield and Beney (2000) and Monks (2003) found similar results when 
examining alumni giving at the individual level, though no explanation of their findings 
is provided by the authors.   
The differences in the findings between this study and others on alumni giving 
may be attributed to the level of analysis.  Because this study involved the use of 
organization-level data, the interpretation of the professional degree program parameter 
estimates is different than the studies that used individual-level data.  Additionally, a 
negative statistically significant relationship between medical programs and alumni 
giving may be attributed to perceived institutional wealth.  Oster (2003), for example, 
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observes that the perception of an institution’s high growth in endowment and wealth 
reduces the likelihood of donations for some donors.  The presence of some professional 
programs, especially at larger institutions, may signal to some alumni that a donation is 
not needed.  This explanation may also account for the non-significant relationship 
between alumni giving and the presence of an MBA program.  Additional research is 
needed in this area. 
 
Endowment Value and Expenditures 
 Endowment value per FTE student and expenditures per FTE were included in the 
model as predictors of SAT midpoint score in the first stage of the statistical model, but 
endowment value was also positively related to alumni giving.  This finding is consistent 
with Winston (1999), who observes that wealthy institutions tend to have more leverage 
in increasing resources such as giving.   
The results of this study indicate that alumni giving is not related to the level of 
expenditures per FTE student.  Gottfried and Johnson (2006) provide evidence that the 
level of expenditures devoted to soliciting alumni donations is positively associated with 
giving.  Due to the limitations of the data source and the change in accounting standards, 
this study did not use a variable that delineated the type of expenditure, which may have 
yielded different results. 
 
Selectivity and Alumni Giving 
 Overall, the findings from this study indicate that it is unlikely that selectivity 
influences alumni giving over time.  Although these results may appear to be inconsistent 
120 
with findings from cross-sectional studies on alumni giving (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 
2008; Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 
1988), the literature does provide some guidance on this inconsistency.  This section 
describes how the findings relate to economic and alternative theories on prestige.  
 
Maximizing Prestige and Alumni Giving 
 The findings from this study are inconsistent with the conceptual framework 
presented in this dissertation.  The conceptual framework indicates that an institution’s 
expenditures and endowment wealth would explain levels of prestige.  Though the 
findings suggest that expenditures and endowment wealth are endogenous to student 
selectivity, endowment wealth is also positively related to alumni giving.  Additionally, 
since student selectivity is not related to alumni giving, it is unlikely that alumni are 
gaining utility through a donation as a result of the institution’s prestige as defined by 
institutional selectivity.  The economic utility-maximizing conceptual framework 
presented in this dissertation is inconsistent with the findings in this study.  Therefore, 
other theoretical perspectives are required to explain the relationship between student 
selectivity and alumni giving.  
 
Accumulative Advantage and Institutional Isomorphism 
Two theories from sociology assist in examining the findings in this study.  While 
studying faculty research productivity, Dey, Milem, and Berger (1997) and Milem, 
Berger, and Dey (2000) assert that two theoretical perspectives (accumulative advantage 
and isomorphism) operate simultaneously to describe institutional behaviors.  
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Accumulative advantage is the increased differentiation of institutions as prestigious 
institutions extend their advantage over less prestigious institutions (Dey et al., 1997; 
Merton, 1968).  Isomorphism, on the other hand, is characterized by institutions adopting 
structures and procedures through social processes to become more similar.  Dey et al. 
(1997) found evidence in their study that both processes are occurring in higher 
education.  The authors (Dey et al., 1997) suggest that less prestigious institutions are 
changing to become similar to institutions with more prestige, but are unable to increase 
their rankings relative to other universities as institutions that already have wealth and 
prestige use their resources to maintain their position.  In other words, less prestigious 
institutions are emulating institutions with more prestige by increasing research 
productivity, but are unable to increase their rankings.  These processes may account for 
differences between the results from this dissertation study and cross-sectional studies on 
alumni giving. 
Accumulative advantage and isomorphism theoretical perspectives are consistent 
with the findings in this study.  The results of cross-sectional studies by several scholars 
(Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Ehrenberg & Smith, 
2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1988) show differentiation in alumni giving based upon 
selectivity or other measure of prestige, providing evidence for accumulative advantage.  
The results from this dissertation study show that although some institutions may 
successfully increase their selectivity by recruiting more talented students (institutional 
isomorphism), these institutions are unable to secure a comparable increase in alumni 
donations (accumulative advantage).  The wealthier and more prestigious institutions 
maintain their position in soliciting donations while aspiring institutions are unable to 
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match the level of donations, despite increasing their prestige.  The statistically 
significant relationship between institutional wealth (endowment) and alumni giving 
provides additional evidence of accumulative advantage. 
Despite the seeming inconsistency with some research, the findings from this 
study have utility.  The results of this study indicate that there is evidence that colleges 
and universities have increased alumni giving over time, which is consistent with the 
observations of a number of scholars (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Heller, 2006), who 
purport that institutions are replacing funds lost from reductions in state appropriations.  
The findings in this study further confirm the advantage that wealthy institutions have in 
raising funds from alumni, which is consistent with Winston’s (1999) observation that 
resources in higher education are unevenly distributed.  Finally, this study provides 
evidence that SAT midpoint score as a measure of prestige or student quality does not 
appear to influence alumni giving over time.   
 
Research Question 2:  Convergence and Divergence of Alumni Giving Rates 
 
Taking into account student selectivity, is there evidence of convergence or 
divergence among public research universities over time in alumni giving? 
 
In this study, the second research question is addressed by examining the sign of 
the coefficient for the lagged alumni giving variable.  The sign of the lagged dependent 
variable coefficient indicates whether there is convergence or divergence in alumni 
giving among public research universities.  A positive sign of the lagged dependent 
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variable would indicate convergence and a negative sign would indicate divergence in 
alumni giving among public research universities over time.  A coefficient of zero would 
indicate that, over time, growth in alumni giving among institutions remains the same.  
Determining convergence or divergence of alumni giving over time allows researchers to 
understand if growth in alumni giving increases relative to other institutions for a college 
or university that increases their alumni giving levels over time.  
The results from this study indicated that there is no evidence of convergence or 
divergence in alumni giving.   This implies that if an institution with low alumni giving is 
able to greatly increase its alumni giving levels, growth in alumni giving would remain 
constant relative to institutions with high levels of alumni giving.    Institutions with low 
alumni giving could increase the level of alumni donations, but only at the average rate, 
making it difficult for these institutions to “catch up” to colleges with high levels of 
alumni giving.   
 These results do not comport with the theories proposed by Hoxby (1997) and 
Geiger (2004) that purport that higher education institutions that increase student quality 
become richer through a multiplier effect:  greater selectivity increases an institution’s 
desirability and demand, which increases quality, and subsequently increases revenue 
through higher donations and higher levels of tuition charged to students willing to pay.  
Although tuition revenues may increase as a result of this multiplier effect, the findings 
suggest that this is not the case for alumni giving.    
Even though the results from this dissertation are inconsistent with the theories 
proposed by some scholars (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997), the results are consistent with 
other studies on prestige.  As stated above, Dey et al. (1997) and Milem et al. (2000) 
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propose two theoretical perspectives that explain why prestige may not influence alumni 
giving.  Whereas colleges and universities are adopting structures and policies to become 
more similar and prestigious by increasing their selectivity (via institutional 
isomorphism), the wealthiest institutions are continuing to maintain their advantage in 
securing donations from alumni when compared to other public research universities (via 
accumulative advantage).  In terms of alumni giving, all institutions in this study have 
increased their giving activities with an average increase in giving at $232 per FTE 
student over the 11 years of this analysis.  Although institutions with low levels of alumni 
giving may be successful in increasing their giving, the growth in giving is the same 
relative to institutions with higher levels of alumni donations.  Since the growth in alumni 
giving is not increasing over time and institutions with high levels of giving also 
experience an increase in alumni donations, it will be difficult for institutions with low 
levels of alumni giving to eventually match institutions with higher levels of giving.  
 
Contributions to the Literature 
In addition to addressing the two research questions presented in this study, this 
dissertation provides three major contributions to the literature in economics and 
philanthropy.  First, this study connects theoretical perspectives of nonprofit 
organizations to the alumni giving literature.  While scholars have examined public good 
(Andreoni, 2006; Halfpenny, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Sun, Hoffman, & Grady, 
2007), social exchange (Halfpenny, 1980; Holländer, 1990; Patouillet, 2001), expectancy 
(Weerts & Ronca, 2006), organization (Kelly, 1998; Patouillet, 2001), and other theories 
to explain alumni support, very little research attempts to explain alumni giving through 
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economic perspectives of nonprofit organizations.  Additionally, no studies have 
extended Garvin’s (1980) theory of university behavior to explain alumni giving.  The 
application of these theories adds another framework to the alumni giving literature. 
Second, this dissertation uses a methodology rarely used in education research.  
The findings from this study suggest that utilizing a system GMM DFEP model may be 
necessary for analyzing alumni giving time series/cross-sectional data.  The OLS, fixed 
effects, and instrumental variable models presented in chapter 4 demonstrate that each 
method yields different findings based upon the assumptions of the statistical technique 
when using panel data.  When evaluating the alumni giving literature, no studies have 
used a DFEP modeling technique to analyze alumni giving over time.  Several 
researchers (Bristol, 1990; Drezner, 2006), for example, rely on descriptive statistics to 
describe factors that influence alumni giving.  Others utilize OLS or logistic regression 
(Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995; Clotfelter, 2003; Cunningham & Cochi-Fiano, 2002; Gaier, 
2005; Harrison, 1995; Holmes, 2009; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Marr et al., 2005; Monks, 
2003; Okunade, 1996; Okunade et al., 1994; Sun et al., 2007; Weerts & Ronca, 2007) or 
advanced economic techniques such as fixed effects or instrumental variable regression 
(Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Harrison et al., 1995), but 
none have utilized dynamic panel models.  While some scholars used panel data 
(Gottfried & Johnson, 2006; Okunade et al., 1994) or utilized an analysis at the 
organizational (instead of individual) level of analysis (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003), it is 
not representative of the literature.  The results from this dissertation study addressed 
some of the limitations of prior studies by using panel data to understand alumni giving 
within a dynamic context.   
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Finally, the findings from this study provide a new perspective on the relationship 
between prestige, as measured by selectivity, and alumni giving.  Many studies 
(Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995; Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Clotfelter, 2003; 
Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1988; 
Yoo & Harrison, 1989) on alumni giving suggest that the prestige of an institution is 
positively related to the level of alumni giving.  The method and level of analysis used in 
this study were better positioned than previous studies to examine prestige’s influences 
on alumni giving over time among public research universities.  The absence of a 
statistically significant relationship between selectivity and alumni giving in this study 
challenges a paradigm in the literature that prestige influences alumni giving. 
 
Conclusions 
 There are at least three conclusions from this study.  First, in the limited 
circumstance where prestige is defined as student selectivity, it is highly unlikely that, 
among public research universities, prestige influences alumni giving over time.  As 
demonstrated above, this finding is consistent with the literature using the theoretical 
perspectives of accumulative advantage and institutional isomorphism.  It should be 
noted that the results may be different if prestige is defined as research productivity or 
college rankings.  
 Second, the results from this study are inconclusive as to whether the conceptual 
framework based on Garvin’s (1980) utility-maximizing model is viable for public 
research universities.  Although this adaptation of Garvin’s (1980) model may explain 
university behavior with regard to research productivity, the model may not be viable for 
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prestige (in terms of student selectivity) and alumni giving.  This is a significant finding, 
given that SAT midpoint score (the measure of student selectivity in this study) is highly 
correlated with rankings publications (Grunig, 1997; Pascarella et al., 2006; Webster, 
2001), which are accessible to alumni.  The conceptual framework, however, may still be 
viable for other definitions of prestige (e.g., research productivity, college rankings, 
athletic success) or donative support (e.g. contributions from corporations, parents) which 
future research should address. 
Third, there is no evidence of convergence or divergence in alumni giving among 
public research universities between fiscal years 1997 and 2007.  Because the lagged 
alumni giving variable is not statistically significant, the growth in alumni giving over 
time is the same for all institutions. 
 
Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research 
 The results from this study pose a number of implications for policy, practice, and 
future research.   This section will describe the implications for policy, practice, and 
research, and provide recommendations for future research on this topic. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 The findings from this study have implications for policy and practice.  The 
primary purpose of the study is to examine whether changes in one measure of prestige 
influence the amount of alumni giving among public research universities.  Because the 
findings in this study are limited to one measure of donative support and one measure of 
prestige, there are no overarching policy recommendations.  Since the findings of this 
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study did not indicate that changes in SAT midpoint score influence alumni giving, 
higher education leaders (particularly at public research universities) should not presume 
that increased selectivity increases revenues.  Until further research is done on the effects 
that other measures of prestige have on revenue streams, higher education leaders should 
use caution when enhancing the prestige of the institution using student selectivity. 
While this dissertation makes no overall policy recommendations for higher 
education leaders, due to its limited scope, the findings imply that increasing prestige 
may not always result in financial benefits.  Although higher education institutions with 
high prestige appear to have more resources and higher graduation rates (Geiger, 2004; 
Meredith, 2004; Winston, 1999), there are unintended consequences to increasing 
selectivity.  Some scholars claim that investing in prestige increases tuition prices 
(Winston, 1999), limits access to college for minority and low income students (Bernal, 
Cabrera, & Terenzini, 2002; Meredith, 2004), reduces the emphasis on classroom 
engagement and student learning (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Pike, 2004; Winston, 
1999), increases faculty workload, and reduces institutional diversity (O'Meara, 2007).  
Given that selectivity is not statistically related to alumni giving, policymakers should 
use caution when increasing selectivity or other prestige measures, given these negative 
consequences. 
 
Implications for Research 
 This study provides several implications for educational research.  First, because 
few studies examine change in alumni giving over time, prior research on alumni giving 
is very limited.  This study demonstrates that a DFEP statistical model may be a viable 
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option for exploring other research questions with respect to prestige and alumni giving.  
Additionally, given that the findings from this study demonstrate differences in results 
between cross-sectional alumni giving studies and dynamic panel modeling techniques, it 
is vital that conventional alumni giving theories be retested using time series/cross-
sectional data and more rigorous statistical techniques. 
 Second, this study uses an economic perspective of nonprofit organizations for 
examining the influence of prestige on alumni giving.  Because economic perspectives of 
nonprofit organizations aren’t widely used in the alumni giving literature, this study 
contributes to the literature by introducing a new conceptual framework.  An economic 
model of nonprofit organizations should be utilized to examine other aspects of college 
and university behavior. 
 Finally, theories on alumni giving are typically based on individual behavior.  
This study uses an organization level framework to describe how organizational behavior 
influences aggregate alumni giving.  This study introduces researchers to a different unit 
of analysis for examining alumni giving and should be expanded to other areas of 
university operations. 
  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study builds on the broader literature on the economics of nonprofit 
organizations in addition to the literature on alumni giving.  This research uses a 
perspective and a method not widely employed in higher education research.  Given its 
limited scope, this study could be expanded by examining other types of prestige, other 
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forms of donative support, and other sources of revenue.  As a result, a number of 
recommendations are provided to expand understanding of university behavior. 
 First, future research should expand on this study by using different definitions of 
prestige.  As described in chapter 2, a review of the higher education literature shows that 
prestige is discussed from the perspective of faculty research productivity (Brewer, 
Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Cyrenne & Grant, 2009; Dey, Milem, & Berger, 1997; Dolan 
& Schmidt, 1994; Melguizo & Strober, 2007; Milem, Berger, & Dey, 2000; Morphew & 
Baker, 2004; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2006), success in intercollegiate athletics (Brewer 
et al., 2002; Tucker & Amato, 1993), and college and university magazine rankings 
(Ehrenberg, 2002a; Ehrenberg 2002b; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999; O'Meara, 2007), in 
addition to perceived student quality/selectivity (Brewer et al., 2002; Cyrenne & Grant, 
2009; Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a; Monks & Ehrenberg, 
1999b).  Each of these definitions should be analyzed in future studies to see if alumni 
maximize utility through prestige or if they are motivated by other factors. 
 Second, future research could build on this study by analyzing different variations 
of donative support.  Although alumni represent a majority of the individual donations to 
colleges and universities (Kaplan, 2008), higher education institutions receive voluntary 
support from a variety of sources.  These include corporations, non-alumni individuals, 
and other nonprofit organizations (Kaplan, 2008).   
 Third, since Garvin’s (1980) theoretical model of university behavior was 
originally proposed in 1980, doctoral research universities have diversified their funding 
streams, mostly because of a reduction in state appropriations (Heller, 2006).  The higher 
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education market has greatly changed in the past 30 years and the model should be 
examined to understand university behavior in this new context. 
 Finally, given that the findings of this study indicate that the student selectivity 
definition of prestige is unlikely to influence alumni giving, this assumption should be 
tested using other theoretical perspectives from the field of industrial/organizational 
psychology, sociology, and education. 
 
Summary 
 The purpose of this study was to examine whether an institution’s selectivity 
influenced the amount of alumni giving among public research universities.  This study 
also introduced a relatively new and rigorous statistical technique for analyzing panel 
data.  Overall the findings from this study question the relationship between this 
definition of prestige and alumni giving.  These findings challenge a major paradigm in 
the literature about the influence of prestige and suggest that more research using panel 
data and rigorous statistical techniques is required to provide a more thorough 
understanding of how prestige influences giving behaviors.  Future research is need to 
expand on this study, including the application of the conceptual framework using other 
definitions of prestige, other forms of donative support, and other forms of revenue.  
Finally, the influence of prestige on alumni giving over time should be examined using 
other theoretical perspectives. 
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
Before conducting statistical tests on the data for this study, this analysis used 
descriptive statistics to understand correlational relationships among the variables.  The 
results demonstrate that without accounting for other variables or endogenous variables, 
researchers can presume that selectivity influences alumni giving.  This appendix 
displays a bivariate correlation matrix and cross-sectional tables to show this relationship. 
Bivariate correlation matrices are used to understand initial relationships among 
variables.  The matrix displayed in Table A1 displays the bivariate correlations among 
the variables used in this study.  The correlation matrix shows a statistically significant 
relationship between midpoint SAT score, the measure of prestige used in this study, and 
alumni giving per FTE.   
 A cross-sectional analysis of the data confirms the findings in the bivariate 
correlation matrix that a correlational relationship between selectivity and alumni giving 
exists.  Table A2 displays the mean amount of alumni giving per FTE by the institution’s 
SAT midpoint score quartile.  In fiscal 2007, institutions with a midpoint SAT score in 
the first quartile had a mean alumni giving of $317 whereas institutions in the fourth 
quartile solicited $1000 more dollars per FTE student.  Although SAT score is correlated 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean alumni giving per FTE by SAT midpoint quartile:  Fiscal 2007 
SAT Midpoint Quartile 
SAT Midpoint 
Interquartile Range 
Mean Alumni Giving 
per FTE 
1st Quartile 800 – 1045  $        316.73  
2nd Quartile 1046 – 1105  572.17  
3rd Quartile 1106 – 1165  894.07  
4th Quartile 1166 – 1600  1334.57  
Notes:  SAT midpoint score is significant correlated with Alumni Giving per FTE student 
with a Pearson R correlation of 0.570 and a significant p-value less than 0.001. 
 
 
selectivity and alumni giving exists over time. 
 When comparing the change in SAT midpoint score with the change in mean 
alumni giving between two time periods, there is an indication that selectivity may 
influence alumni giving.  As demonstrated in Table A3, most public research universities 
in this study saw an increase, controlling for inflation, in alumni giving per FTE between 
fiscal 1997 and fiscal 2007 with a mean increase in alumni giving of $232 per FTE.   
Institutions with an SAT midpoint score that dropped one or more quartiles had a lower 
change in alumni giving per FTE at $195.  Institutions with that improved SAT midpoint 
score by one or more quartiles had a higher change in alumni giving per FTE at $310.  
This descriptive data, however, fails to take into account other variables or changes in 
selectivity and alumni giving in the intervening years.  In order to accurately determine if 
prestige as measured by SAT score influences alumni giving, this study utilizes more 
complex statistical models.   
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Table A3 
Change in mean alumni giving per FTE by change in SAT midpoint quartile:  Fiscal 1997 
and fiscal 2007 
Change in SAT Midpoint Quartile 
Change in Mean Alumni 
Giving per FTE 
SAT Midpoint Score Decreased (n=22) $         194.77  
SAT Midpoint Score Remained Steady (n=60) 216.38  
SAT Midpoint Score Increased (n=22) 310.40  
All Institutions (n=104) 231.71  





PANEL TESTS FOR NON-STATIONARY DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 To ensure all the assumptions are met for the dynamic fixed effect panel models, 
two statistical tests, called unit root tests, are used to test non-stationary characteristics of 
the data in this study.  The first test, proposed by Maddala & Wu (1999) is designed for 
unbalanced panels.  The second test, proposed by Hadri (2000) provides detailed 
information about non-stationary characteristics under differing assumptions.  This 
section describes the method and results for these two statistical tests. 
Stata software (IC version 10.1) is used to uncover non-stationary characteristics 
of the data using these two tests.  Table B1 displays the Stata variable names for the 
commands used in this analysis.  Using the xtset command, the dataset was declared to be 
a time series panel with the institution specific identifier (unitid) as the panel variable and 
year (year) as the time variable: 
. xtset unitid time        (6.1). 
In the first statistical test, Maddala and Wu (1999) propose using the fisher statistic to 
compare independent unit root tests for each institution time-series to uncover non-
stationary characteristics in the data.  This statistic is the only panel unit-root test 
available for unbalanced panels.  The user-written Stata command, xtfisher, calculates the 
statistic proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999): 










Dependent Variable   
     Alumni giving  alum 
Independent Variables (Endogenous)   
     Alumni giving, lagged 1 year  L1.alum 
     SAT score  sat 
Independent Variables (Exogenous)   
     Professional Degree Programs   
          Law (JD)  law 
          Business (MBA)  bus 
          Medicine (MD)  med 
     Endowment value  endw 
     Expenditures  exp 
     New GASB Standard  gasb 




The results are displayed in Table B2 for all the variables in this study.  The null 
hypothesis is a non-stationary time-series for all higher education institutions.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that at least one institution displays a stationary time series.  As 
demonstrated in Table B2, all the tests resulted as statistically significant at the 0.001 
level.   Although these significant tests suggest that some data are stationary, it only takes 
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Table B2 
Fisher panel unit root test results by variable 
 Fisher χ2  
Statistic 
  
Alumni giving 897.772 *** 
Alumni giving, lagged 1 year 564.579 *** 
SAT score 348.558 ** 
Endowment value 555.464 *** 
Expenditures 496.797 *** 
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 
one stationary panel to trigger the significant results.  Another unit-root test is required to 
understand non-stationary characteristics in the data.  
 Hadri (2000) developed another test to uncover non-stationary characteristics in 
data that provides more information than Maddala & Wu’s (1999) panel fisher unit root 
test.  Although Hadri’s (2000) test can only be used with a balanced panel, it can provide 
results under assumptions of homoskedasticity or heteroskedasticity.  Additionally, the 
test can also uncover both time trend and individual unit roots.   
Because the test can only be used on a balanced panel, a subsample of 78 
institutions with complete panels is included in the analysis.  Stata software is used to test 
for non-stationary characteristics of the dependent variable utilizing the user-written 
hadrilm command: 
.hadrilm alum         (6.3). 
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The null hypothesis for this test, in contrast to the fisher test, is a stationary trend whereas 
the alternative hypothesis is non-stationary.  As demonstrated in Table B3, all unit-root 
tests except for one reject the null hypothesis providing evidence of non-stationary data 
in the panels.  Under conditions of homoskedasticity, the test indicates a non-significant 
result at the 0.05 level indicating the possibility of stationary alumni giving data.  The 
probability of non-stationary data, however is still high with a p-value of 0.072 or 
significance at the 0.10 level.  In other words, under conditions of homoskedasticity, 
random sampling from identical populations would lead to a smaller difference than 
observed 92.8 percent of the time and larger than observed 7.2 percent of the time.   Non-





Hadri panel unit root test results for alumni giving per FTE student in subsample 
 Z Statistic 
  
Homoskedastic Across Units  
     Time Trend Unit Root (Zτ) 1.460 
     Individual Unit Root (Zµ) 5.155 *** 
Heteroskedastic Across Units  
     Time Trend Unit Root (Zτ) 2.335 ** 
     Individual Unit Root (Zµ) 4.919 *** 
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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These findings show that corrections are necessary to model the effects of 
selectivity on alumni giving with non-stationary data.  A dynamic fixed effects panel 
model using generalized method of moments, by definition, uses first-differenced terms 
to compute the statistic.  Other linear regression models presented in this dissertation will 




TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
 
  Since heteroskedastic characteristics of variance may yield incorrect standard 
errors for coefficient estimates, this study includes a test for heteroskedasticity.  To test 
for heteroskedasticity, Wiggins and Poi (2009) recommend saving the coefficient 
estimates of a panel Generalized Linear Model (GLS) with corrections for 
heteroskedasticity and compare these coefficient estimates with the same model without 
corrections for heteroskedasticity using a likelihood ratio test.  This section describes that 
method for testing heteroskedasticity using Stata software. 
Stata software (IC version 10.1) is used to test for heteroskedasticity by 
comparing two versions of a panel GLS model.  Using the xtset command, the data set 
was declared to be a time series panel with the institution specific identifier (unitid) as the 
panel variable and year (year) as the time variable: 
. xtset unitid time         (6.4). 
The following Stata command yields the results of the panel GLS model with corrections 
for heteroskedasticity: 
. xtgls alum L(1/1).alum sat law bus med endw exp time gasb, igls 
panels(heteroskedastic)        (6.5). 
The coefficient estimates are then saved to memory so the two models can be compared 
at a later step.  The file is called “hetero” to represent a model with the corrections: 
 . estimates store hetero         (6.6). 
A model without the correction for heteroskedasticity is yielded with the following 
command: 
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. xtgls alum L(1/1).alum sat law bus med endw exp time gasb   (6.7). 
Wiggins and Poi (2009) recommend constraining the number of panels to be a single 
value in the second model using the following command: 
. local df = e(N_g) – 1        (6.8). 
The test likelihood ratio test is obtained by comparing the coefficients from the first 
model “hetero” with those of the second model represented by a period in the following 
command: 
. lrtest hetero . , df(`df')         (6.9). 
 The null hypothesis for this test is the coefficient estimates are the same for both 
models.  The alternative hypothesis is that the coefficient estimates are different 
indicating that corrections for heteroskedasticity are necessary.  The test yielded a Chi-
Square value of 781.62 with a p-value less than 0.001 indicating that it is highly probable 
that alumni giving per FTE has heteroskedastic residuals.  Dynamic fixed-effect panel 
models using system Generalized Method of Moments is robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTION OF STATA COMMANDS FOR STATISTICAL MODELS 
 
This Appendix presents the commands and the results for the statistical models 
presented in this study.  All of the statistical models presented in this study were 
generated using Stata software (IC version 10.1) using the variables names presented in 
Table B1.  For each of the regression models in this study, the dataset was declared to be 
a panel dataset using the xtset command: 
. xtset unitid time        (6.10). 
 
The following commands and results are presented in this appendix: 
• ordinary least squares regression; 
• panel fixed effects regression; 
• panel instrumental variable regression; 
• dynamic fixed effects panel using difference generalized method of moments; and 
• dynamic fixed effects panel using system generalized method of moments. 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects Regression 
 The first sets of models presented in this study are Ordinary Least Squares and 
Fixed Effects regression models.  The following Stata command yields the OLS model 
presented in chapter 4, Table 4.2: 
. regress alum sat law bus med endw exp yr* gasb    (6.11); 
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. regress alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp yr* gasb   (6.12); 
where “regress” designates the Stata command for OLS regression and alum is placed in 
the first position designated for the dependent variable.  The asterisk “*” next to the “yr” 
variable name indicates that all variables that begin with “yr” should be included in the 
model.  The year 1996 is the reference year.  The fixed effects regression model is 
specified using the following command: 
. xtreg alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, fe   (6.13). 
where “xtreg” indicates a special case of regression designed for a panel dataset and the 
command “fe” requests the fixed effects estimator.  The results presented in Table 4.2 do 
not account for cluster effects within each institution in the panel.  The following 
commands correct for clustering effects to provide more robust standard errors by 
accounting for intragroup correlation: 
. regress alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp yr* gasb, vce(cluster unitid) (6.14); 
. xtreg alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, fe vce(robust)  (6.15); 
where the “vce” command is used to account for intergroup correlation.  Table D1 displays the 
results from these two commands. 
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Table D1 
The influence of SAT score on alumni giving per FTE Student:  Ordinary least squares 
and fixed effects regression models with error correction estimated coefficients and 
standard errors 
 Model 1a: OLS 
Regression 
Model 2a:  Fixed 
Effects Regression 













Professional Degree Programs   


























   
   
Observations 1,177 1,177 
Number of Institutions 145 145 
Year Dummy Variables? Yes Yes 
   
F-Statistic 369.23 *** 4.87 *** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.800 0.410 
   






Panel Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Regression 
 The next model presented in the results section is panel instrumental variable 
regression, commonly known as two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.  The 
following Stata command yields the model presented in chapter 4, Table 4.3: 
. xtivreg2 alum L1.alum law bus med gasb yr* (sat = endw exp recordid), small 
cluster(unitid) fe first gmm2s orthog(recordid)     (6.16). 
The first variable list yields the second stage of the calculation with alumni giving per 
FTE as the dependent variable and lagged alumni giving, law, business, medicine, GASB 
standards, and year dummy variables as independent variables.  SAT score is also an 
independent variable but isn’t listed until the second variable list in the parentheses.  The 
first stage of the calculation is in the second variable list where SAT midpoint score is the 
endogenous variable and endowment and expenditures are the predictors.  Record ID is 
included in the list to test for overidentifying restrictions.  The “small” command requests 
the small-sample statistic (F-statistic rather than a chi-squared); “cluster(unitid)” requests 
corrections of intragroup correlation for each institution; “fe” requests the fixed effects 
estimator; “first” requests output detailing the first stage of the calculation; “gmm2s” 
requests that computations use the two-step generalized method of moments estimator; 
and “orthog(recordid)” tests for overidentifying restrictions.  The two stages of the model 




The influence of SAT score on alumni giving per FTE student:  Panel instrumental 
variable (2SLS) regression estimated coefficients and standard errors 
 First Stage Second Stage 
   
Dependent Variable SAT score Alumni giving 




SAT score  19.776 
(8.554) 
* 
Professional Degree Programs   












Endowment value 0.004 
(0.002) 








   
   
Observations 1,173 1,173 
Number of Institutions 141 141 
Number of Instruments 16 14 
Year Dummy Variables? Yes Yes 
   
R-Squared 0.117  
   
Hansen J Statistic  7.541 * 
F-Statistic 2.46 ** 3.53 *** 
   
Notes:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
1 Endowment value per FTE was significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Dynamic Fixed Effects Panel Model with Difference and System GMM 
 The next models presented in the results section are the dynamic fixed effects 
panel models using difference and system generalized method of moments (GMM).  The 
following Stata command yields the initial difference GMM model: 
. xtabond2 alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, gmm (L1.alum sat, 
collapse) iv(endw exp law bus med yr*) small twostep robust orthogonal  
nolevel         (6.17). 
In this initial model, the first variable list represent the linear regression model with 
alumni giving per FTE (alum) the dependent variable and SAT midpoint score, law, 
business, medicine, endowment per FTE, expenditures per FTE, GASB standards, and 
year dummy variables as independent variables.  The “gmm” subcommand requests the 
GMM estimator and endogenous variables are included in the parenthesis including 
lagged alumni giving and SAT score.  The “collapse” command within the parenthesis 
minimizes the number of instruments.  The “iv” subcommand lists the variables that are 
presumed to be exogenous.  GASB is not included in this list because it is in the model as 
a control.  The “small” command requests the small-sample statistic (F rather than a chi-
squared).  The “twostep” command requests the calculation of the two-step estimator 
instead of the one-step estimator.  “Robust” request that the Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample correction for variance be used in the two-step estimator.  When calculating first-
differences, the “orthogonal” command subtracts the average of past and future values of 
lagged variables instead of the value from the previous time period.   Roodman (2006) 
recommends using the “orthogonal” command in unbalanced panels.  The “nolevel” 
149 
command requests the Arellano-Bond (1991) first-difference GMM calculation instead of 
the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM. 
 Because this initial command produces more instruments than is necessary, the 
extra instruments can cause standard errors to increase and the model to be overspecified.  
The model is therefore adjustment by reducing the number of lags used to calculate the 
GMM estimator.  This is done by including another term in the “gmm” command.  The 
final model is listed below and is presented in Table 4.3 in the results section: 
. xtabond2 alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, gmm (L1.alum sat, 
collapse lag(1 4)) iv(endw exp law bus med yr*) small twostep robust orthogonal  
nolevel         (6.18). 
The initial system GMM command is similar to equation 6.17 except that the “nolevel” 
command is excluded.  Instead of calculating the Arellano-Bond (1991) first-difference 
GMM estimate, it calculates the default Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator: 
. xtabond2 alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, gmm(L1.alum 
sat, collapse) iv(endw exp law bus med yr*) small twostep robust  
orthogonal         (6.19). 
Again, the lags are limited so that only the strongest instruments are used to correct the 
standard errors in the model.  The final system GMM model is listed below requesting 
the first through eight lags be used to compute the statistic: 
. xtabond2 alum L1.alum sat law bus med endw exp gasb yr*, gmm(L1.alum sat, 
collapse lag(1 8)) iv(endw exp law bus med yr*) small twostep robust  
orthogonal         (6.20). 
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